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Abstract
The key objective of pension plans is the delivery of retirement benefits,
typically payable for life or a set period of time, to the specified group of
recipients. The management of such funds entails therefore a constant mon-
itoring of the risks exposure and a regular rebalancing of assets.
This thesis is directly related to these topics and proposes a quantitative
method (mainly based on stochastic optimal control theory) to determine
the optimal investment policy of a pension fund’s wealth, under financial
and actuarial risks.
The thesis unfolds as follows: Chapter 1 includes a basic introduction to pen-
sion systems. The topics addressed here are: how to classify pension systems,
the main characteristics of each kind of system, examples of major systems
and the important reforms that have been implemented in Italy; the chapter
ends with a description of Italian professional order pension funds. Chap-
ter 2 describes asset liability management techniques in pension schemes; it
contains a review on major literature on asset liability management and a
discussion on interested parties in this topic and on policies and instruments
which can be adopted. Chapter 3 contains an original model to determine the
optimal financial investment policy in a pension fund, considering both finan-
cial and actuarial risk. Moreover, the model takes care of the pension plan’s
sustainability, i.e. of the balance between the active and retired members.
Chapter 4 is a numerical application of the model described in the previous
chapter to a real Italian pension fund. Finally, in Chapter 5 conclusions are
drawn related to the question asked.
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Riassunto
Il principale obiettivo di un qualsiasi piano pensionistico e` garantire al lavora-
tore il mantenimento del tenore di vita nel periodo successivo alla cessazione
dell’attivita` lavorativa. Questo obiettivo viene raggiunto tramite l’erogazione
di rendite pensionistiche, che tipicamente hanno una durata aleatoria coinci-
dente con la vita residua del pensionato. La gestione di questo tipo di fondi,
ed in particolare la gestione finanziaria, richiede un continuo monitoraggio
dell’esposizione del patrimonio gestito a una serie di rischi finanziari e at-
tuariali, nonche` un regolare ribilanciamento degli asset in cui si investe.
Il presente lavoro e` direttamente collegato a queste problematiche e propone
un metodo quantitativo (principalmente basato sulla teoria del controllo ot-
timo stocastico come strumento per determinare l’asset allocation dinamica
ottimale) per stabilire la strategia di investimento migliore, tenedo conto dei
rischi finanziari e attuariali in cui incorre il fondo pensione.
La tesi e` stata strutturata nel seguente modo. Il Capitolo 1 inquadra l’oggetto
della tesi nel piu` ampio spazio del sistema pensionistico; in particolare si dis-
cute della classificazione delle varie forme previdenziali e delle loro peculiari
caratteristiche e ci si sofferma in modo specifico sul sistema italiano e sul suo
iter di riforme. Il capitolo 2 descrive le tecniche di asset liability management
nei fondi pensione; e` inclusa una disamina della piu` importante letteratura a
riguardo e un’analisi dei soggetti interessati alle scelte di asset liability man-
agement nonche` degli strumenti coi quali tale tecnica di risk management
puo` essere resa effettiva. Il capitolo 3 presenta il modello originale proposto
per determinare la strategia di investimento ottimale in un fondo pensione,
tenendo conto sia del rischio finanziario che di quello attuariale. Inoltre, il
modello tiene conto anche della necessita` di mantenere la sostenibilita` del
fondo, cioe` del bilanciamento costante tra partecipanti al fondo attivi (lavo-
ratori in attivita` che pagano i contributi) e passivi (pensionati che ricevono
la rendita previdenziale). Nel capitolo 4 e` presentata un’applicazioen prat-
ica del modello alla gestione degli investimenti di una Cassa di previdenza
15
di un ordine professionale italiana, mentre nel capitolo 5 vengono tratte le
conclusioni scaturite dalle analisi condotte nei capitoli precedenti.
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Chapter 1
The social security retirement
program
I advise you to go on living solely to enrage those who are paying your
annuities. It is the only pleasure I have left.
Voltaire
The social security retirement program, also called pension system, is a
specific scheme to provide for retirement income. It is a part of the social se-
curity system which, as its name implies, is a scheme established to enhance
the well-being of an individual against any misfortune caused by accidents,
the inability to work or in the case of dependants, even death.
The aim of a pension system is to provide funds for pensioners to live without
significant differences with the working period. Let us note that one could
divide human life into three main phases: youth, productive years, and retire-
ment. There are many perspectives on this division, but in this work we are
interested in the economic one. Youth is therefore the period when a person,
through education, acquires human capital, i.e., the ability to earn income
throughout one’s productive life. Acquisition of education, i.e., investment
in human capital, is among the most important financial issues in a person’s
life. Another such issue is, of course, the accumulation of financial capital for
retirement, the subject of this work. Human capital acquired mostly during
one’s youth is gradually used up during one’s productive life. One may argue
that a person should re-acquire education later in life, as the human capital
accumulated early in life does become obsolete eventually, as the technology
of production changes. Ironically, the blessing of longer life enjoyed by most
17
of the world’s population in the twentieth century has made such a threat
of a need for re-acquisition of human capital more likely. Nevertheless, even-
tually one’s physical and mental ability to work is depleted, and somewhere
before or at that moment, one needs to replace human capital with financial
assets allowing for comparable standard of living.
The importance of the provision of a proper pension system can never be
over emphasized. By 2007, more than 170 countries has adopted some form
of public pension systems. Public pension expenditure are often the largest
fiscal program in many countries. For example, in 2000’s, in Europe, it’s
about 12,1 percent of total GDP (15,38% in Italy in 2008); in North Amer-
ica, it is about 7,1 percent; it is relatively low in Asia, about 3 percent.
1.1 Pillars of a pension system
To avoid misunderstanding, it is useful at the onset to define terms. Tradi-
tionally, specialists have divided pensions into three pillars (see Figure 1.1)
• Public pensions
• Occupational pensions
• Personal pensions
Fig. 1.1: Three Pillars Pension System
Within each pillar there are many types of pensions, sometimes referred
to as ”tiers”, but the three categories exhaust all possibilities with respect to
providers of pensions. There are only three sources of pensions: government
schemes, schemes set up by a trade union or employers, and individual an-
nuities. For some purposes, this is a useful way to look at pension systems,
especially if the aim is to compare pension systems in different countries.
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There exists an alternative framework developed by the World Bank Bank
[1994] in a now famous Report titled Averting the Old Age Crisis. The au-
thors of the Report analyse the problem of income maintenance in old age
not from the perspective of pension providers but rather from the perspective
of those who participate in retirement income schemes. Somewhat confus-
ingly, the Report retains the terminology of ”three pillars”, and refers often
to Pillar 1 as synonymous with ”public pillar”, even though the second pillar
in this scheme typically is, and the third pillar could conceivably be, publicly
managed. The Report defines its three pillars in this unique and useful way:
• Non-contributory (basic pension)
• Contributory (forced savings)
• Contributory (voluntary savings)
The first pillar is an anti-poverty pillar that is non-contributory and guar-
antees a minimum income in old age. The second is a forced savings pillar
that provides benefits only to contributors, and, in general, provides the most
benefits to those who contribute most. The two mandatory pillars differ only
in whether benefits are flat, or related in some way to contributions. The Re-
port is prescriptive rather than descriptive when it¿ recommends separating
the saving function from the redistribution function and placing them under
different financing and managerial arrangements in two different mandatory
pillars, one publicly managed and tax-financed, the other privately managed
and fully fundedÀ. Pillar 3 is a voluntary savings pillar, available to anyone
who cares to supplement the retirement income provided by the first two pil-
lars. The first pillar protects the elderly from absolute poverty (consumption
below a minimum subsistence level), whereas the second two pillars protect
them from relative poverty (a fall in consumption following retirement).
The first pillar is invariably public, financed by government on a pay-as-you-
go basis. It is possible to imagine private employers or trade unions providing
each covered worker with a pension unrelated to earnings or contributions,
but in practice this never happens.
Pillar 2 almost everywhere has traditionally been public and pay- as-you-go
as well; increasingly it is private and funded, in part or in whole. The World
Bank encourages governments to fund Pillar 2 and to shift management from
the public to the private sector.
The third pillar is identical to the second, except that it is always funded
and is typically private because participation is voluntary. It is important to
note that contributions to pillars two and three need not result in pensions.
Benefits can be (and often are) drawn as a lump sum or as a series of with-
drawals beginning at a specified age.
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All retirement income falls by definition into one of these three World Bank
pillars. Wherever the state (or, conceivably, an employer, a trade union, a
charity or an extended family) provides benefits to the elderly that are not
related to earnings or contributions, this is Pillar 1. Pillar 2 consists of en-
titlements derived from mandatory contributions to a pension or retirement
savings scheme. Pillar 3, we have seen, is voluntary, thus it encompasses all
other retirement income.
1.2 Classification of pension plans
In this section we will present a short review of the most important types
of pension plans, which may be, for the purpose of our classification, part of
any of the three legs of the retirement security stool.
1.2.1 Financing mechanism in pension schemes
The first criterion for the classification of pension plans is the financial base
for the liabilities for benefits promised to plan participants. There exists the
two kind financial system. The first one is the Fully Founded system (FF).
In this case the pension plan asks workers a contribute that the plan itself
provides to invest and give back at the end of working life in an amount
equal to how much the worker gave during his working life capitalized at the
market rate. So the FF is a way to transfer agent personal richness in the
time. It’s a sort of saving account.
The second system is the so-called Pay-as-you-go system (PAYG). Here
the pension plan collects workers contributions and uses them to pay pensions
to pensioners. So we can understand how the PAYG is a system based on a
transference in the space between current contributors to current pensioners.
This can be a problem, because, as stated in Samuelson [1958] and in Aaron
[1966], it is sustainable only if we have a rate of growth of total real earnings
that exceeds the interest rate indefinitely and this happens when there is
technological progress and/or steady population growth and excessive capital
accumulation. Problems arise at this point. The first one is that in this
system people often receive a pension that is a relatively high percentage (in
Italy between 75% and 80%, 100% up to few years ago) of their last salary,
while the pensioner contributed in a proportional way during his working life,
also when he was earning less money (it provides, also, a distortion in labour
market pushing at working hard old worker and inhibiting young ones). The
second one depend on the fact that pensions are often object to discussions
under general elections, so there is an incentive for government to use them
20
Pay-as-you-go Fully Funded
Intergenerational transference be-
tween current contributors to current
pensioners
Contributors’ personal richness trans-
ference in the time
No Capitalization Capitalization
Table 1.1: Pay-as-you-go vs Fully Funded financial mechanism
in order to ”capture”more votes. The latter aspect is largely less probable in
the Fully Founded system because the pension scheme is already determined
by the contribution the pensioner gives (even though the interest rate can
be changed). Table (1.1) summarizes the main features in pay-as-you-go and
fully funded systems.
1.2.2 Calculation methods for benefits
There are two extremely different ways to determine benefits. On the one
hand, we find defined benefit plans (hereafter DB), where benefits are fixed
in advance by the sponsor and contributions are initially set and subsequently
adjusted in order to maintain the fund in balance. DB plans are definitely
preferred by workers. In fact, in the case of DB plans, the associated financial
risks are supported by the plan sponsor rather than by the individual member
of the plan. In fact, as we can see in Figure (1.2), the value of the pension do
not depend on the value of financial assets deriving from the capitalization
of workers’ contributions. Actually, DB pension plans can be split into risk
sharing plans and no risk sharing plans (see Table 1.2 below). Risk sharing
plans contain features that allow the pension fund to mitigate the risk by
sharing part of it with the sponsor and/or with the plan members. In pension
plans without risk sharing, the risks stay within the pension fund. In a first
step, generic pension plans that do not allow for risk sharing with the plan
sponsor and/or the plan members are defined. These are the standard final
pay and the standard career average plan. The main features of both plans
are:
• Final pay systems
We distinguish two variants of the system based on final salaries.
– Actual final pay system: in this system, every wage increase not
21
Defined Benefit Pensions
No risk sharing Risk sharing
Final Pay Career average with risk sharing fea-
tures
• Actual
• Moderate
• Additional contribution
• Conditional indexation
• benefit cuts
Average earned salary
• Actual
• Moderate
Table 1.2: Defined Benefit Pensions
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only affects the rights which will be built-up in the remaining years
of service, but also in the previous built-up rights.
– Moderate final pay system: this system only differs from the sys-
tem described above, in the sense that wage increases in the last
years of service do not result in a higher pension. This prevents
that (extreme) wage increases in the last years of service result in
a very high pension.
• Systems based on the average earned salaries
Also for systems based on the average earned salaries, two variants are
distinguished.
– A system based on the actual average earned wage: in this system,
every wage increase influences the pension that will be built-up in
the remaining years of service. The pension over previous years of
service remains unaltered.
– An indexed system based on the earned salaries: this system is
characterized by the fact that the pension based on past years of
service are corrected for increases in prices or wages.
The generic pension plans that do allow for risk sharing are career aver-
age (CA) plans with a risk sharing feature. The risk sharing features can be
additional contributions, conditional indexation and benefit cuts. An impor-
tant risk sharing aspect of pension plans is the fact that the plan sponsor
may be required to make additional contributions in case of underfunding.
In a similar way, future contributions of plan members may be increased in
an underfunding situation. These risk-sharing mechanisms do not occur in
the life insurance sector and therefore deserve special attention. For further
details see Peek et al. [2008].
Historically, fund managers have mainly proposed DB plans,but nowadays
most of the proposed second pillar pension plans are based on a defined
contribution scheme involving a considerable transfer of risks to workers. In
defined-contribution plans (hereafter DC) contributions are fixed and benefits
depend on the returns on fund’s portfolio (see Figure 1.3). In particular, DC
plans allow contributors to know, at each time, the value of their retirement
accounts. DC pension funds provide contributors with a service of saving
management, even if they do not guarantee any minimum performance. As
we have already highlighted, only contributions are fixed in advance, while
the final retirement account fundamentally depends on the administrative
and financial skill of the fund managers. Therefore, an efficient financial
management is essential to gain contributors’ trust. Often the employer
23
Fig. 1.2: Defined Benefit Pension Scheme
yearly transfers money (usually a percentage of the pensionable salary) to
purchase a part of the employees’ pension. The level of the pension depends
on the number of years the pension contributions have been paid, the realized
return in the years the pension has been built up, and the interest rate at
the moment of retirement.
1.2.3 Types of pensions
Every type of pension provides the participant with an income after some
event has happened. In this section, we discuss the most important types of
pensions.
• Retirement pension.
This is a pension for the financial care of a person, payable after pen-
sionable age is reached. Generally, this payment is made lifelong.
• Widow’s pension.
This is a form of surviving relatives pension, that is paid to the widow(er)
of a participant of the pension regulation. Generally, this payment is
also made lifelong.
24
Fig. 1.3: Defined Contribution Pension Scheme
• Pension in case of disability
This type of pension is made after the participant of the fund has
become incapacitated for work.
1.3 The Italian Pension System and its re-
forms
Italy is facing a demographic challenge substantially greater than the average
for all the countries of the European Union (see 1.4 below).
Moreover, we can observe the current Italian population pyramid (Figure
1.5) and its predicted shape for 2050 (Figure 1.6). A Population Pyramid
is a graph that shows a country’s population by age and gender. The shape
of the pyramid tells us about a country’s growth rate and dependency ratio.
Population pyramids have the youngest age cohort at the bottom and females
on one side and males on the other. Each age-gender group is represented as
a percentage of the total population or in thousands of people. For furthers
details see Cackley et al. [2006], Baldini et al. [2002], Brugiavini and Peracchi
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Fig. 1.4: Projected Economic Old Age Dependency Ratios for the EU mem-
ber States, 2008/2060
[2004].
Fig. 1.5: Italian Population Pyramid in 2010 (data in millions)
Italian population pyramid warn us about the future predominance of
older generations compared to the younger ones.
1.3.1 Three pillars Italian pension system
Currently, the Italian pension system consists of three pillars (see Figure 1.7):
1. Mandatory old age insurance (MOA), which also provides survivors
insurance and disability benefits.
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Fig. 1.6: Predicted Italian Population Pyramid for the year 2050 (data in
millions)
2. Supplementary pension systems, including closed-end funds formed by
employers and/or employees, and collective pension funds, which are
mostly funded and voluntary.
3. Private insurance annuities or individual accounts. Supplementary pen-
sions and private insurance substitute for the MOA in only a few cases.
They are generally not mandated and they are funded.
In addition to the public pension program, Italian workers receive a sev-
erance from the Trattmento Fine Rapporto (TFR), which is equal to the
cumulative total of 7.41 percent of earnings in each year for workers in the
private sector. This is paid by employers and retained in a fund that the
employers manage directly. It is paid out as a lump sum at retirement, and
in the meantime serves as a source of capital for the employer. This structure
is the result of a series of reforms. However, debate continues about the need
for additional reforms, as additional funding or further reductions in benefits
are needed to keep the program solvent. For further details see Amato and
M. [2001].
The following section is devoted to a review of the reforms concerning the
pension system in Italy.
Institutions of the Italian first pillar pension scheme
The current national insurance scheme consists of two principal institutions:
the Istituto Nazionale di Previdenza Sociale (INPS) and a social secu-
rity institution for public administration employees Istituto Nazionale di
27
Fig. 1.7: The pillars in the Italian Pension System
Previdenza dell’Amministrazione Pubblica (INPDAP).
INPS administers the ”Assicurazione Generale Obbligatoria” (AGO) (Com-
pulsory General Insurance Scheme), of which most private sector employees
are members, as well as the employees of certain semi-public bodies. All
employees over 14 years of age in Italy are insured under AGO. AGO pays
invalidity, old-age and survivors’ benefits. Currently 10,2 million employees
get one single pension by INPS, of which 6,1 millions belonging to private sec-
tor. The self-employed have their own compulsory general insurance scheme,
which is broken down into four funds, administered by INPS, for the crafts
sector (1,117,986 members), the trading sector (854,867 members), farming
(942,042 members) and ”para-subordinate” workers (717,035 members), to-
talling 3,631,930 members. For further details see INPS [2009].
INPDAP currently insures 3.289.700 public sector employees, mainly through
the Special Fund for Public Administration Employee Pension Schemes and
the Pension Fund for Local Authority Employees.
The social security institutions of self-employed members of the professions
comprise 20 independent and privatised pension funds,totalling 249,443 mem-
bers. The process of planned transition of the 1995 reform envisages the
provisional co-existence, until 2015, of the previous earnings- related system,
on the way to extinction, and the present contribution-based system.
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Institutions of the Italian second pillar pension scheme
Complementary pension schemes were introduced in 1995. This additional
voluntary, supplementary occupational system (Pension Funds), consists of
both open funds and closed collectively agreed funds. The closed funds can be
funded by both employers and employees as well as from the TFR. The open
funds provide an annuity based on contributions. The current TFR contribu-
tion rate is 6.91%. The number of workers enrolled in a private pension fund
is still low. For this reason, the Finance Act for 2007 has anticipated (with
some changes) the pension reform passed some years ago (Law 243/2004 and
legislative decree 252/2005) which introduced further measures in order to
speed up the development of the second pillar: a) higher fiscal incentives and
b) silence-as-assent for the transfer of the private severance pay (TFR).The
latter means that the current severance pay accumulation will be transferred
to a private pension fund, unless the worker communicates his or her refusal.
Institutions of the Italian third pillar pension scheme
The first and second pillar retirement pensions are not always as high as
an individual would like it to be. The third pillar (individual private
pensions) is supplied from a two sources:
• personal fund (FIP - forme pensionistiche individuali)
It is an individual instrument that fulfill the purpose in supplying re-
tirement provisions in addition to the collective ones. The funds accu-
mulated are invested and the ensuing profit is added to the pension.
• life insurance contracts (Polizze vita)
They are insurance contracts to provide investors supplemental retire-
ment income via a life insurance policy featuring market appreciation,
tax-deferred accumulation, and a life insurance death benefit.
1.3.2 Italian Pension System reforms: from the origins
to 1992 reform
During the first half of the XX century, the Italian pension system was
a public funded system, to which employers, workers, and the state con-
tributed with not so much different contributions. Dramatically hit by the
very high inflation rate during and immediately after World War II, it was
changed into an unfunded public pay-as-you-go system (paygo), which was
fully constructed during the years between 1957 and 1968. They were years of
high rate of economic and demographic growth, which brought about a very
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generous pension system (see Angrisani et al. [2001], Cackley et al. [2006],
Castellino and Fornero [2001], Castellino and Fornero), Cazzola [2004].
The main features of the system built during those years are the following:
• Pensions were determined by the earnings related formula P = c ∙T ∙w,
where c is the so-called internal return coefficient, T is the number of
years of contribution (T could not exceed 40), and w is the reference
wage. For employees of the private sector, c was 0.02, and w the average
wage of the last five years of work, expressed in terms of the final year
prices. The age for the old age pension was 55 for women, and 60 for
men.
• ”Seniority pensions” (pensione di anzianita`) were introduced, allow-
ing early retirement for private employees, once they had reached 35
years of contribution to the pension system, independently of the age.
The benefit was computed exactly in the same way as indicated above,
without any consideration of the difference in the life expectancy at the
different ages of the early retirees.
• Public employees had a privileged position. For several categories of
civil servants, the coefficient c was higher than 0.02. For all public
employees, the reference wage was the wage of the final year of work.
Every civil servant had the right to retire when he reached 20 years
of seniority; in the case of a woman with two children the minimum
seniority to early retirement was 14 years, six months, and one day.
Again, early retirement pensions were not actuarially fair.
• In between 1957 and 1965 the public unfunded pension system was
extended to all the self-employed. Artisans, shop keepers, farmers,
professionals had to contribute to their new pay-go funds, but at the
beginning they were allowed to get the benefit as soon as they reached
the age of 65, under the condition that they had contributed at least for
a year. The original pension formula related the benefit to the amount
of contribution. In 1990, a new rule was enacted for self-employed,
which granted pension benefits proportional to the average earnings
over the last 10 years of work with an accrual rate of 2%. Having not
modified the level of contributions accordingly (12% of gross income for
self-employees instead of 27,4% of the gross salary for the employees,
at that time), this modification caused a huge growth of future pension
net liabilities. Currently, a large share of retired self-employees still
receive a benefit which is integrated by the state in order to reach the
national minimum level of the benefit. One should not forget that
self-employment represents 30% of overall employment, in Italy.
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• From 1971 to 1992, pensions were indexed both to price increases, and
to the average real wage growth.
• The system allowed a uniform substitution rate, but an internal return
on contribution variable in the opposite direction with the degree of
seniority, with the rate of growth of wage during the working life, and
with the age of retirement.
The system built in those years produced a rapid increase of pension
expenditure till the first half of the nineties. Such an increase of expenditure
was also supported by a large diffusion of inability pensions, as substitutes of
the lacking unemployment insurance for workers of a mature age. The higher
line in Figure 1.8 below shows how expenditure would have grown, in the 50
years later 1992, without any of the reforms enacted during the last decade.
Fig. 1.8: Pension expenditure in terms of GDP
1.3.3 The first step of the reform: 1992
In 1984 the rules for inability pensions were restricted to the physical inability
to work instead of the more general inability to produce income. The long
process of reduction of the number of inability pensions is still underway,
and it is a component of the slowdown of the growth of pension expenditure.
However, it was only in September 1992 that, under the pressure of a deep
currency and financial crisis, an effective process of reform started. The first
Amato government introduced some important new principles in the system.
The determination of the benefits should stick more to insurance principles
through a stronger relationship with the amount of contributions paid during
the working life. The reference wage was not to be any longer the wage of the
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last five years of work, but the average of the last 10 years, to be extended,
in the future, to the whole working life. The formula for the computation of
the first pension benefit for an individual who entered the labor market after
1992 can be expressed as follows:
P = 0.02 ∙ L ∙W0
[
L∑
i=1
(1 + w)i−1 ∙ (1 + 0.01 (L))
L
]
where W0 is the entry wage, w is the average growth of workers’ wages
and L is the seniority at retirement. Current and future generations cannot
any longer afford sharing technical progress with retirees; hence the benefits
were not any longer indexed to real wages. Moreover, the portion of pension
higher than three times the official minimum benefit level is not any longer
fully adjusted to consumer price changes.
The privileges of the civil servants started to be dismantled: a very slow
process of convergence toward the system for private employees was enacted.
The seniority required to a civil servant to retire early was increased.
The age for old age pension had to be progressively increased to reach 60
years for women, and 65 for men (this target has been reached in 2000).
Moreover, the minimum number of years of contribution required in order to
receive the benefit was increased from 15 to 20 years.
Occupational funds and individual funds should complement the paygo sys-
tem, in order to face demographic transition. The legislation required was
enacted, but the fiscal incentives were not enough to let those funds start.
The strongest impact of these measures was to be exerted by the abolition
of the indexation of benefits to real wage growth. As a whole, all these mea-
sures helped workers to realize that the generosity on which they had built
their life cycle wealth expectations was not any longer sustainable. It has
been shown that households, whose breadwinner was a civil servant, felt the
strongest effect.
1.3.4 The second step: 1995-97. The notional defined
contribution system
Three years later, in 1995, the Dini government enacted a radical reform of
the system of computation of the benefit, based on true insurance princi-
ples, applied within a paygo system. The Prodi government in 1997 further
integrated the reform. The new notional defined contribution system is a
paygo system that mimics capitalzation. The amount of contribution paid to
the paygo system during the whole working life is going to be capitalised at
the rate of growth of nominal GDP (actually, a five years moving average of
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GDP growth). Such an amount of capitalized contributions is the basis for
the computation of the benefit by means of a discount rate that is a proxy
of the expected long rate of growth of real GDP (1.5 per cent, in real terms
because the benefit is indexed to prices).
The worker can choose the age of old age pension, once he/she is 57 years
old, and is not yet 65. At 65 the retirement is compulsory. The computa-
tion of the benefit takes into account the average life expectancy (men and
women) at the age the worker chooses to retire. When the new system fully
works at regime, the return in terms of benefit to the contributions is the
same for every worker, independently of the age of retirement, of the life time
wage profile, and of the seniority at the moment of retirement. No difference
between men and women age for pension will survive.
Under the new system, the benefit is approximately determined by the fol-
lowing simplified formula:
P = aj ∙ w0
[
T−1∑
t=0
(1 + yn)
T−t−1 (1 + g)t
]
γ (yr, ω, s)
with
∂γ
∂yr
> 0;
∂γ
∂ω
,
∂γ
∂s
< 0
where aj is the contribution rate equal to 33% and 20% respectively for em-
ployee and self employed, w0 is the entry wage of an employee of T years of
seniority, yn is the average rate of growth of nominal GDP (the capitalisation
rate) during the last T years, g is the average rate of growth of the nominal
wage during the same T years, and γ(.) is the value of a coefficient which
depends on the constant discount rate yr = 0.015 (the expected long run real
growth rate of GDP), on the weighted average of the life expectancy of men
and women (ω), and on the probability to have a survivor, combined with
his/her life expectancy, s.
The notional defined contribution system introduces actuarial fairness within
a paygo system; the degree of redistribution and solidarity enacted trough
the pension system is reduced, though not canceled. The system reduced
distortion in labor market decisions especially with regards to the choice of
retirement age. Moreover, it reduces, in a sense, the perverse solidarity of
the current system, where workers with less dynamic careers and lower wages
finance benefits of the workers with higher and more dynamic wages. A real
jungle of various privileges will be cleared: more favorable treatment both of
civil servants (with special reference to military forces), and self-employees
with respect to private employees will disappear. With the new system, true
solidarity is going to be mainly a question of the general taxation.
If there is not any relevant long run change in income distribution between
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Before 1991 After 1992 After 1995
Age Employee Self
employed
Employee Self em-
ployed
Employee Self em-
ployed
58 71,2 67,8 61,9 61,9 54,4 33,0
60 71,2 67,8 61,9 61,9 57,8 35,0
62 71,2 67,8 61,9 61,9 61,7 37,4
65 71,2 67,8 61,9 61,9 68,7 41,6
Table 1.3: Replacement rate between pension benefit and last wage at dif-
ferent retirement ages for an individual who retires with seniority equals to
37 years
profits and wages, the new system tends to balance revenues and payments
in a structural way. Given the anticipated real growth of GDP used as a
discount rate to compute the benefit, the higher the actual rate of growth,
the higher the revenues, and the benefits. Parametric reforms in 1992 and
1995 reduced the expectations for future level of pension benefits and the
change in the indexation mechanism reduced the dynamic of pension benefit
after retirement. The first effect can be seen by comparing the replacement
rate, defined as the ratio between the first pension benefit and the last wage.
In Table 1.3 we report the replacement rate at different age of retirement for
a representative individual whose seniority at retirement is equal to 37 years.
We notice that both the 1992 and the 1995 reform reduced the replacement
rate. With the notional defined contribution formula the replacement rate in-
creases with the retirement age as the formula considers explicitly the average
life expectation at retirement. The parameters of the defined contribution
scheme are fixed such to reach the same replacement rate that of 1992 for a
62 years old employee. The reduction of the replacement rate is stronger for
self employed after 1995 because of the lower level of the contribution rate
used to the computation of the pension benefit, which for this category is
fixed at 20%.
To fulfill the equilibrium conditions of the system, the coefficients used
to compute the benefit will be changed every ten years to take into account
changes in life expectancy. If life expectancy increases, the substitution rate
between wage and benefit will be reduced, but the worker might choose to
work longer to compensate such a reduction.
The new system will not fully work before 25-30 years, since now; therefore
the reform has dealt with the many details of the long transition process. It
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has created three different cohorts: the young employees, the middle seniority
employees, and the mature seniority employees. The new system applies fully
to the new entrants since the beginning of 1996. For the employees that at the
end of 1995 had seniority, in terms of years of contribution, of not more than
17 years, the new system applies only for the remaining part of their working
life. Their benefit will be the result of two parts; the first one determined
according to the old computation rules, and the second one according to the
new rules. Finally, for employees with seniority equal or higher than 18 years
in 1995 the rules for the computation of the pension benefit remain the same
as pre-1995. Early retirement benefits are completely abolished when the new
system works at regime. In the mean time, for workers already at work in
1995, early retirement is progressively restricted to those who are 57 years old
and have a seniority of 35 years; these conditions will apply in 2004. On that
date, the pension rules for both civil servants, and private employees will be
exactly the same. In other words, early retirement benefit, computed without
actuarial fairness, is still allowed for employees that currently have middle,
and mature seniority, when they meet the above restricted conditions.
1.3.5 International pension systems
Aging population and pension system reform is not a phenomenon only in
Italy. Historically, social security systems were almost all PAYG. However,
it is widely recognized that these systems generate many problems such as
rising payroll tax rates, evasion and early retirement. Many countries have
undertaken major or minor reforms of their pension systems in the past
30 years. Some countries went through radical reforms and changed into
fully funded pension system, some chose a mixed system with a combination
of both, and the rest stayed with the original PAYG pension systems and
modified parameters such as contribution rate and retirement age.
The following part of this is section is dedicated to a brief description of some
relevant international social security system.
Social Security System in the United States
Established in the 1930s, the US Social Security system is a mandated, pub-
lic defined benefit system with very wide and compulsory participation. Few
groups are permitted to opt out. The average pension benefit represents a
replacement rate of approximately 50 percent of the best 35 years of salary
history. Some adjustment is made to redistribute pensions to poorer partic-
ipants; hence, individual replacement rates may differ from the average. To
this end, the replacement rate offered to those with a poor income history is
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Pre-Reform 1992 Reform 1995 Reform
Normal retire-
ment age
60 (men) 55
(women)
65 (men) 60
(women)
Any age, starting
at 57 (men and
women)
Pensionable
earnings
Average of last
5 years real
earnings
Career average
earnings
Career contribu-
tions (capitalized
at an annual rate
using a five-year
moving average of
past GDP growth
rates)
Pension benefit 2% *(pen-
sionable earn-
ings)*(years of
tax payments
≤ 40)
2% *(pen-
sionable earn-
ings)*(years of
taxpayments
≤ 40)
Proportional to ac-
crued value of ca-
reer contributions;
proportionality
factor increases
with age up to age
65
Years of contri-
butions needed
for eligibility
15 20 5
Total payroll tax
(employee and
employer)
24.5% gross
earnings
27.1% gross
earnings
32,7% gross earn-
ings
Table 1.4: Changes in Key Features of Italian Pensions During the 1990s
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higher than for those with a higher income. Benefits are paid until death, in-
clude substantial indexation to in inflation (since 1972), and are extended to
survivors. The system was designed along the lines of a PAYG system with
current contributors largely financing pension payments. Today, the Social
Security system is not the pure PAYG system, it was in the mid-1970s. With
the prevailing contributions, the system was unavoidably heading toward in-
solvency. As a result, the Greenspan Commission in 1982-1983 recommended
a sharp rise in contributions, which would permit building up a reserve, the
so-called Trust Fund, to cover future shortages.
401(K) Plans and Individual Retirement Accounts in the United
States
These schemes are most prevalent in the United States and are most com-
monly referenced when discussing funded defined contribution plans. Under
the 401(K) schemes, both employers and employees contribute to these funds
from pre-tax income. Participants are free to choose investment strategies
from a set of chosen private providers who manage the assets for the partic-
ipants. They are allowed to borrow from their account, within limits and at
their discretion, but must repay under established rules. Under the Individ-
ual Retirement Accounts, individuals set up the plan directly if they meet
certain eligibility criteria. Participants have sufficient choice in the structure
(i) to select their asset allocation (a mix of bonds and equities; international
and domestic assets) and (ii) to select preferred manager(s) from a short list
of managers and mutual funds. Participants either have full discretion over
asset allocation and fund selection (self-directed plans) or can delegate the
responsibility to the service provider. Withdrawal of funds is permitted to
finance certain activities, but if these monies are not returned before retire-
ment, the participants incur a tax event because the Individual Retirement
Accounts is no longer a tax-deferred saving. The pension is the annuity that
can be purchased from service providers given the accumulation at retire-
ment. In both systems, participants have some discretion over the level of
contributions, but there are limitations on maximum contributions. These
caps on contributions exist because such savings are tax deferred. However,
the caps have changed over time, allowing participants to change the amount
they contribute to these plans.
The Chilean Defined Contribution Model
The Chilean model, implemented in 1981, involves gradual phasing out of
the PAYG plan and replacement by a mandatory DC plan. New workers can
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participate only in the DC plan, whereas participants in the PAYG plan can
still choose between the old and new plans. Assets are managed by private
companies chosen by the participant from a list approved by the government
with individuals largely bearing the risk of investment performance. There
are some guarantees in the Chilean system including: a low social assistance
benefit to those not covered by the mandatory plan, a state-guaranteed min-
imum pension of approximately 25 percent of the average wage if contribu-
tions are made for at least 20 years, a minimum profitability rate guaranteed
for each pension fund relative to the average for the country, and state-
guaranteed annuity payments if the insurance company fails. Variations of
the Chilean Scheme adopted in other parts of Latin America (in Argentina,
Colombia, and Peru) offer a choice in the second pillar between a privately
managed defined contribution system and a public PAYG defined benefit sys-
tem. However, individuals are permitted to make voluntary contributions to
their funds to allow for early retirement.
Mandatory Provident Funds
Mandatory Provident Funds are prevalent in countries formerly under the
Commonwealth (such as India and Malaysia). Under these schemes, indi-
viduals contribute to the system, which then aggregates funds in a central
pool. Such schemes are generally offered to private sector employees. The
pooled fund is then invested in different assets, and the participants earn
dividends on their contributions, which are essentially equal to the returns
of the investment strategy. In some countries, dividends are smoothed over
a few years of returns to reduce volatility, which leaves open the possibility
that the system will be ”underfunded” if a series of negative returns occurs.
In Malaysia, a minimum guaranteed of 25 percent is offered to participants.
Participants have individual accounts but no choice. Generally, participants
are allowed to borrow against these funds to purchase house or make other
investment that are deemed socially useful.
1.4 Italian Professional Orders self-administrated
pension funds
The privatization of retirement funds of self-employed was implemented by
the Legislative Decree (D.Lgs) 509/1994, which has enabled the transforma-
tion of 16 institutions in private associations or foundations from the first
January, 1995. Those pension funds adopted a PAYG financial regime. The
purpose of this law is to reorganize existing pension institutions.
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The two key legislative actions immediately following are: Law 335/1995 and
D.Lgs 103/1996. Thus it is possible for these institutions to acquire legal per-
sonality, making its members independent of the public welfare. The new 5
funds, built by D.Lgs 103/1996, follow a fully funded financial scheme. Ta-
ble 1.5 is a list of all existing professional orders pension funds. For further
details see ADePP [2005], Cackley et al. [2006], Carbone [1998], Castellino
[1998], Dallocchio [2001], Inglese [2004], Trudda [2008].
The social security of professional orders is not marginal inside the Italian
pension system. About 1.3 million workers, equal to 5.6% of total employ-
ment, are registered as contributors to the private pension system of Italian
professional orders. The share of subscribers has increased notably for some
funds (engineers and architects, lawyers and chartered accountants), others
remain stationary (notaries), while other ones have experienced a reduction
(accountants).
Table 1.5: Italian Professional Orders self-
administrated pension funds
Cassa nazionale di previdenza e assistenza avvocati e procuratori leagli
Cassa nazionale di previdenza e assistenza tra dottori commercialisti (CN-
PADC)
Cassa nazionale di previdenza e assistenza geometri
Cassa nazionale di previdenza e assistenza ingegneri e architetti liberi pro-
fessionisti (INARCASSA)
Cassa nazionale del notariato
Cassa nazionale di previdenza e assistenza ragionieri e periti commericiali
Ente nazionale di assistenza per gli agenti ed i rappresentanti di commercio
(ENASARCO)
Ente nazionale di previdenza e assistenza consulenti del lavoro (ENPACL)
Ente nazionale di previdenza e assistenza medici (ENPAM)
Ente nazionale di previdenza e assistenza farmacisti (ENPAF)
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Table 1.5: Italian Professional Orders self-
administrated pension funds
Ente nazionale di previdenza e assistenza veterinari (ENPAV)
Ente nazionale di previdenza e assistenza per gli impiegati dell’agricoltura
(ENPAIA)
Ente nazionale di previdenza e assistenza a favore dei biologi (ENPAB)
Ente nazionale di previdenza e assistenza dei periti industriali (EPPI)
Ente nazionale di previdenza e assistenza per gli psicologi (ENPAP)
Ente nazionale di previdenza e assistenza per gli infermieri professionali, gli
assistenti sanitari e le vigilatrici di infanzia (IPASVI)
Fondo di previdenza per gli impiegati delle imprese di spedizione e agenzie
marittiime
Istituto nazionale di previdenza dei giornalisti italiani (INPGI)
Opera nazionale assistenza orfani sanitari italiani (ONAOSI)
Ente previdenza e assistenza pluricategorale (attuari, chimici, dr agronomi,
dr forestali, geologi)
Professional orders funds privatization resulted in self-governing man-
agement, organization and accountancy and in the adoption of a corporate
governance (statute, regulations, etc) which has to obey to specific criteria
with regard to:
• disclosure and transparency in relations with the fund members and in
the settlement of the corporate organization to make known the roles
and responsibilities of board and management to provide shareholders
with a level of accountability.
• determination of the necessary requirements to perform institutional
activities (in particular, honourableness and professionalism for direc-
tors and executives)
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• the creation of a particular legal reserve fund.
Until 1995, Italian professional order retirement funds were administrated
by the State that would step in, in case of insolvency. Since 1995, private pen-
sion plans have managed the security of a growing number of self-employed
without being sponsored by the State. The pension funds of professional
orders are now self-managed and they continue to operate according to a
PAYG financing mechanism. As already highlighted in this chapter, this is
an anomaly because private closed schemes are usually funded. In this par-
ticular system the financial self-sufficiency is certainly guaranteed only in the
initial phase, because there are many contributors and no actual pensioners.
In the long run it is necessary for the financial sustainability of the pension
plan that the number of pensioners remains proportional to the number of
workers. If the ratio active/retired decreases, the increase in the financial
burden can entail a situation of financial disequilibrium. This is most rel-
evant for the retirement funds of each specific professional order for which,
unlike in a public system, there is indeed no intergroup compensation.
To sum up, we can say that for PAYG pension funds, in which the financial
sustainability is related to a balance between the active and retired mem-
bers, there is a further demographic risk source to take into account: the risk
relates to future monetary cash flows necessary to ensure payments of future
pensions.
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Chapter 2
Asset Liability Management in
a Pension Plan
There are risks and costs to a program of action. But they are far less than
the long-range risks and costs of comfortable inaction.
John F. Kennedy
From the point of view of financial economics, we divide the assets into
the real assets and financial assets (also known as capital assets, or securi-
ties). The real assets are used for current consumption or production, and
if they are used for current production, they are a source of current income.
On the other hand, the financial assets are claims to future production or
consumption, i.e., claims to future income, in the form of stocks, bonds,
derivative securities of various types, etc.
Pension plans, just as other financial intermediaries, such as banks, insur-
ance companies, or mutual funds, typically hold financial assets on the asset
side of their balance sheet. Sometimes, although rarely, pension plans may
hold real assets, such as real estate, but even then, such assets are held for
investment purposes, i.e., they are held in order to produce future income for
plan participants, and consequently, they play the role of financial assets.
On the other side, a pension fund’s liabilities are the benefits paid to a
scheme’s members and consists of a series of cash flows that the scheme must
pay out in the future. The cash flows are usually calculated by an actu-
ary (see section 2.1.4) and are based upon the aggregate forecast of all the
benefits for the members. Typically, the expected cash flows are based on
a snapshot of existing members and will not take account of future joiners.
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Pension fund liabilities are long-dated; their calculation involves forecasting
far into the future (50 years or more) to estimate what payments will be
made, as well as the value that these distant payments should have today.
2.1 Asset Liability Management for Pension
Plans
Asset Liability Management for pension funds is a risk management ap-
proach, which takes into account the assets, the liabilities, and also the inter-
actions between the different policies which the board of a pension fund can
apply (Berardinelli et al. [2007]). The board of a pension fund should find
acceptable policies that guarantee with large probability that the solvency
of the fund is sufficient during the planning horizon and, at the same time,
all promised benefit payments will be made. The solvency is the ability of
the pension fund to fulfill all promised payments in the long-run. Usually,
the solvency at a certain time moment is measured as the funding ratio.
Recall that this is the ratio of assets and liabilities.
Underfunding occurs when the funding ratio is less than one. Another way of
characterizing underfunding is by saying that the surplus is negative,where
the surplus is the difference between the value of the assets and the value
of the liabilities. The surplus is the part of the reserves of the pension fund
that is not needed for paying benefit payments. The funding ratio changes
over time, mainly because of fluctuations in the liabilities and in the assets.
Therefore, a pension fund rebalances its asset portfolio and adjusts for exam-
ple its contribution rate regularly, in order to control changes of the funding
ratio over time. In case of distress, the sponsor of the fund may have to help
out with a remedial contribution.
In the ALM decision process, conflicting interests of different parties exist.
In the next section, we will look in more detail at the interests of different
parties. In section 2.1.2 we discuss the policies and instruments which are
at the disposal of the board of pension funds. For further details see Aitken
[1996], Fornero [1999], Micocci [2009], Micocci and Coppini [2001], Micocci
[1999], Vigna and S. [2001].
2.1.1 Interested parties in the ALM policy of a pension
plan
At least four parties are involved in the decision making process by the board
of a pension fund, or are interested in its results. First of all, the active par-
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ticipants are (or should be) interested. They are especially concerned about
the level of the contribution rate. Active participants make contributions
on a regular basis to the fund to build up rights concerning (some of) the
different types of pensions described in section 1.2.3. If the contribution rate
increases for example, the active participants have to make a larger contribu-
tion to the pension fund, which results in a lower disposable income. Older
active participants are also interested in the degree of indexation of their
pension: they would like to be compensated for inflation in all years. .
A second interested group consists of retired persons and surviving relatives
of them. For this group, especially the indexing policy is important. Of
course, they would like to receive full compensation for increases in prices or
wages.
The sponsor of the fund is also involved. Not only does the sponsor pay a
part of the regular contributions, also in case of financial distress the spon-
sor can play an important role. If the funding ratio drops below a certain
threshold, the sponsor of the fund in some cases could contractually be forced
to restore the funding ratio. On the other hand, in case of financial pros-
perity, the sponsor could also benefit. Note, however, that not all pension
funds have a sponsor. Every pension fund related to a single company has
a sponsor. Moreover, neither the government can act as a sponsor of the
Italian Professional Orders funds (see section 1.4). Other funds related to
companies in the same branch of industry, or funds for individuals with the
same occupation, may not have a sponsor. Next to concerns about the level
of the contribution rate and the level of remedial contributions and restitu-
tions, the sponsor is also interested in the costs associated with carrying out
the pension administration.
The last party discussed here is the supervisor of the fund. Pension funds
have to justify and report their activities to the supervisor. The role of the
supervisor differs from country to country.
Although all parties discussed here will be satisfied in case of financial pros-
perity, tensions between (some of) these groups are to be expected if the
financial position of the fund is weak. Pensioners would like to receive an
index-linked pension. However, this may result in even more pressure on the
funding ratio, and in addition, on higher contributions by active participants
or even a remedial contribution by the sponsor of the fund. On the other
hand, this field of tension makes ALM problems challenging. For further
details see Ambachtsheer and Don Ezra [1995].
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2.1.2 Policies and instruments
The board of a pension fund has many instruments to its disposal to control
the funding ratio. These are discussed in this section. The board should
take into account the interests of all parties involved in the decision making
process, to find the best policy mix. We stress here that the ALM process
is considered from the perspective of the pension fund. Figure 2.1 shows the
major policies and rules by which the fund can control the funding ratio.
Fig. 2.1: Policies and rules of a pension plan
• Pension policy
The pension policy deals with decisions with respect to the different
types of pensions that the fund includes in the pension regulation. Ac-
tive participants and retired people are interested in the pension policy,
because they are the ones who will receive money from the pension fund.
• Pension system
The rules with respect to the benefit payments are registered in the
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pension rules. In these rules, the pension system is described. Es-
pecially the sponsor and the active participants are interested in the
pension rules, because they have to finance the system.
• Indexing policy
The indexing policy is important in valuing the liabilities and (future)
benefit payments. The board of a fund has to decide which base to
use, for example a consumer price index, or a wage index. Moreover,
generally every year again it has to be decided whether the financial
position of the fund suffices to give (full) compensation. An actuary
plays a key role in this decision. Retired people and active participants
all would like to be compensated for increases in prices or wages. These
are the parties who benefit from indexing pension rights.
• Reinsurance policy
Pension funds can seel out certain risks, like the risk of decease or
disability, partially or entirely to an insurance company. This is called
reinsurance and is part of the reinsurance policy of the pension fund.
The supervisor judges the reinsurance policy of pension funds. The
supervisor tries to avoid that pension funds are exposed to much risk.
• Contribution policy
The board of a pension fund can not only manage its liabilities, also
the assets can be managed. One of the instruments to manage the
assets is by means of the contribution policy. In the contribution policy,
the system is chosen on which the level of the contribution rate is
determined. Most pension funds use a dynamic contribution rate. In
this system, the level of the contribution rate can be modified in the
course of time. However, it is also possible that the different interested
parties involved in the decision process agree about a fixed contribution
rate. The active participants and the sponsor are the parties who are
mainly interested in the level of the contribution rate, because they
have to finance the system. Details about the different contribution
systems that exist are beyond the scope of this thesis.
• Investment policy
The value of the assets is also influenced by the investment policy. In
this policy, the board of the pension fund decides in which asset classes
the fund invests its assets. Also the levels of the lower and upper bounds
on the fraction of the total assets invested in each asset class, and rules
concerning rebalancing are part of the investment policy. For example,
it is possible that investments are made in indices, or that assets are
47
actively managed. Also investments to reduce risks, like currency hedg-
ing, are considered. The supervisor is concerned about the investment
policy, because investments directly influence the risk of underfunding.
Pension funds should invest their assets such that this risk is small. To
do so, rules exist with respect to levels of buffers which pension funds
need if they invest in certain asset classes.
This thesis is particulary concerned on investment policy and it devel-
ops in this direction.
2.1.3 Literature on Asset liability Management
The popularity of ALM in pension funds seems to have risen in recent years.
Society of Actuaries (2003) provides a useful definition:
ALM is the practice of managing a business decisions and ac-
tions taken with respect to assets and liabilities are coordinated.
ALM can be defined as an ongoing process of formulating, im-
plementing, monitoring and revising strategies related to assets
and liabilities to achieve organizations financial objectives, given
the organizations risk tolerances and other constraints. ALM is
relevant to, and critical for, sound management of the finances of
any organization that invests to meet its future cash flow needs
and capital requirements
Most obviously, ALM should be the cornerstone of any pension institution’s
investment policy. Feinberg [2002] reports that many pension funds are now
conducting more asset/liability studies mainly due to the deterioration of
their funded status. She has interviewed many pension fund managers to
learn the reason for the recent increase in the popularity of the asset/liability
studies. The demand for these asset/liability studies has occurred due to
various reasons, including: market conditions, switching from defined benefit
funds to defined contribution funds, additional contributions, increased lia-
bilities due to the baby boomers retirement and changes in the future benefits
structure.
According to Chernoff [2003], a pension fund cannot just maximize its re-
turn by using traditional efficient frontier method (see further section 2.3.2).
The correct way is to match pension assets against pension liabilities, and he
simplifies:
match the assets and the liabilities and go to bed
Ito [1995] argues that the aim of pension fund asset management is to provide
funding for the pension liabilities, but a pension fund sponsor has also a
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secondary goal that is the achievement of an ”earnings spread” (i.e. the
positive gap between assets and liabilities), as this earnings spread can reduce
the requirement for future contributions.
2.1.4 The role of the actuary in the management of
pension plans
Actuary is a figure which has the expertise mainly in pension fund and life
insurance areas. In both cases the actuary must rationally value products,
which provide the customer with future income stream, in return for a pre-
mium stream paid to the provider. There are, however, some fundamental dif-
ferences between life insurance and pension plans (see AA.VV. [1995], Aitken
[1996], Anderson [1992]). First, most pension plans have fewer participants
than the typical number of customers of an insurance company. Pension
plans vary in their member count from as few as one or several participants
to, rarely, as many as hundreds of thousands, but a typical customer base
of a life insurance company is at least in tens of thousands, if not hundreds
of thousands. This smaller number of participants means that random fluc-
tuations of assets and liabilities of pension plans may have a more profound
effect on plan funded status than in the case of a life insurance company.
This increased uncertainty must be taken into account by the actuary when
establishing pension plan liabilities. The second key difference lies in the tim-
ing of benefit payments. Pension plan participants may withdraw from the
plan early, due to termination of employment. They also generally have great
latitude in choosing their retirement age, within the bounds set by the early
retirement age and the latest age allowed by the plan. The actual amount of
the benefit will be directly influenced by the date chosen and, additionally,
indirectly, the date will affect the final salary (or final salary average), again
influencing the benefit amount. This makes the work of the plan actuary
more challenging, especially if one wants to achieve stable normal cost, a
common desire among employers.
Pension plan management requires substantial involvement of the plan ac-
tuary (see Coppini and Micocci [2002]). In the case of defined contribution
plans, the actuary must assure that all applicable regulations are followed,
and that existing plan assets provide appropriate level of projected benefits
for plan participants. In the case of defined benefit plans the role of the plan
actuary is especially pronounced: it is the actuary who values plan benefits
granted.
In general, a pension plan actuary has the following responsibilities:
• to know generally the accepted pension valuation and funding methods,
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• to know which methods are applicable to the plan under consideration,
• to establish appropriate assumptions for valuation,
• to estimate the effect of plan size on the stability of its funding,
• to value benefits other than retirement benefits, if granted (e.g., dis-
ability benefits);
• to model future cash flows of the plan,
• to value plan assets appropriately and
• to model sensitivity of the plan to changing parameters such as interest
rates, mortality, or general economic variables.
The above list illustrates that the plan actuary must possess vast knowledge
and experience in order to meet such a variety of responsibilities.
2.2 Investment Policy and Asset Allocation
In investment policy, the board of the pension fund decides about the asset
classes in which the fund invests its wealth. Asset allocation is the process
of choosing among possible asset classes.
A large part of financial planning consists of finding an asset allocation that
is appropriate for a given investor in terms of their appetite for and ability
to shoulder risk. This can depend on various factors. Asset Allocation is
the product of an examination of an investor’s needs and objectives. Asset
allocation, done well, is a plan to invest in assets or asset classes which will
best meet the needs and objectives of the investor. Investors seeking high
returns and willing to expose their investments to an elevated amount of risk
will allocate to equity (ownership) investments. Investors seeking stability
and income will allocate to debt investments. Most investors, particularly
personal investors, will find mixtures of equity and debt investments most
nearly meets their needs. Asset Allocation can be practised by optimization
techniques, minimizing risk for a given level of return or maximising return
for a given level of risk. It also can be accomplished as goal based investing.
Asset allocation techniques are based on the idea that in different years a dif-
ferent asset is the best-performing one. It is difficult to predict which asset
will perform best in a given year. Therefore, although it is psychologically
appealing to try to predict the ”best” asset, proponents of asset allocation
consider it risky. Experts in the field note that someone who ”jumps” from
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one asset to another, according to whim, may easily end up with worse re-
sults than does someone following any consistent plan.
A fundamental justification for asset allocation is the notion that different
asset classes offer returns that are not perfectly correlated, hence diversifica-
tion reduces the overall risk in terms of the variability of returns for a given
level of expected return. Therefore, having a mixture of asset classes is more
likely to meet the investor’s wishes in terms of amount of risk and possi-
ble returns. In this respect, diversification has been described as ”the only
free lunch you will find in the investment game1”. Academic research has
painstakingly explained the importance of asset allocation and the problems
of active management. This explains the steadily rising popularity of pas-
sive investment styles using index funds. Although risk is reduced as long as
correlations are not perfect, it is typically forecast (wholly or in part) based
on statistical relationships (like correlation and variance) that existed over
some past period. Expectations for return are often derived in the same way.
When such backward-looking approaches are used to forecast future returns
or risks using the traditional mean-variance optimization approach to asset
allocation of modern portfolio theory (MPT) (see 2.3.2), the strategy is, in
fact, predicting future risks and returns based on past history. As there is
no guarantee that past relationships will continue in the future, this is one
of the ”weak links” in traditional asset allocation strategies as derived from
MPT. Other, more subtle weaknesses include the ”butterfly effect”, by which
seemingly minor errors in forecasting lead to recommended allocations that
are grossly skewed from investment mandates and/or impractical, often even
violating an investment manager’s ”common sense” understanding of a ten-
able portfolio-allocation strategy.
Once asset allocation had been decided, portfolio managers try to create ex-
tra value by taking advantage of certain situations in the marketplace, or, in
other words, they perform a so called tactical asset allocation. It is an active
management portfolio strategy that rebalances the percentage of assets held
in various categories in order to take advantage of market pricing anomalies
or strong market sectors. Many papers are devoted to understanding the
importance of asset allocation in explaining the total financial wealth of a
fund in comparison with tactical asset allocation. In 1986, Gary P. Brinson,
L. Randolph Hood, and Gilbert L. Beebower published a study about asset
allocation of 91 large pension funds measured from 1974 to 1983. They re-
placed the pension funds’ stock, bond, and cash selections with corresponding
market indexes. The indexed quarterly return were found to be higher than
pension plan’s actual quarterly return. The two quarterly return series’ linear
1Paul Merriman, Merriman Inc founder
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correlation was measured at 96.7%, with shared variance of 93.6%. A 1991
follow-up study by Brinson et al. [1991] measured a variance of 91 5%. The
conclusion of the study was that replacing active choices with simple asset
classes worked just as well as, if not even better than, professional pension
managers. Also, a small number of asset classes was sufficient for financial
planning. Financial advisors often pointed to this study to support the idea
that asset allocation is more important than all other concerns, which the
Brinson [1986] study lumped together as ”market timing” (tactical asset al-
location).
In 1997, William Jahnke initiated debate on this topic, attacking the Brin-
son [1986] study in a paper titled The Asset Allocation Hoax. The Jahnke
[1997] discussion appeared in the Journal of Financial Planning as an opinion
piece, not a peer reviewed article. Jahnke’s main criticism, still undisputed,
was that Brinson [1986]’s use of quarterly data dampens the impact of com-
pounding slight portfolio disparities over time, relative to the benchmark.
One could compound 2% and 2.15% quarterly over 20 years and see the siz-
able difference in cumulative return. However, the difference is still 15 basis
points (hundredths of a percent) per quarter; the difference is one of percep-
tion, not fact.
In 2000, Ibbotson and Kaplan used five asset classes in their study¿Does As-
set Allocation Policy Explain 40, 90, or 100 Percent of Performance?À. The
asset classes included were large-cap US stock, small-cap US stock, non-US
stock, US bonds, and cash. Ibbotson and Kaplan [2000] examined the 10 year
return of 94 US balanced mutual funds versus the corresponding indexed re-
turns. This time, after properly adjusting for the cost of running index funds,
the actual returns again failed to beat index returns. The linear correlation
between monthly index return series and the actual monthly actual return
series was measured at 90.2%, with shared variance of 81.4%. Ibbotson and
Kaplan [2000] concluded 1) that asset allocation explained 40% of the vari-
ation of returns across funds, and 2) that it explained virtually 100% of the
level of fund returns. Gary Brinson has expressed his general agreement with
the Ibbotson and Kaplan [2000] conclusions.
A 2000 paper by Meir Statman found that using the same parameters that
explained Brinson [1986]’s 93.6% variance result, a hypothetical financial ad-
visor with perfect foresight in tactical asset allocation performed 8.1% bet-
ter per year, yet the strategic asset allocation still explained 89.4% of the
variance. Statman [2000] says that strategic asset allocation is movement
along the MPT efficient frontier, whereas tactical asset allocation involves
movement of the efficient frontier. A more common sense explanation of the
Brinson [1986] study is that asset allocation explains more than 90% of the
volatility of returns of an overall portfolio, but will not explain the ending
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results of your portfolio over long periods of time. Hood notes in his review of
the material over 20 years, however, that explaining performance over time
is possible with the Brinson [1986] approach but was not the focus of the
original paper.
2.2.1 Literature on optimal asset allocation in pension
funds
The debate over an optimal asset allocation for a pension fund has two ex-
treme views. One view states that bonds are the only way to match assets
with liabilities, while the contradicting view recommends equity exposures.
Equity and fixed income are generally the biggest investment classes in pen-
sion funds. Bodie et al. [1999] argue that a pension fund, with a financially
sound sponsor corporation, should not invest in equities at all. A fully funded
pension fund should only invest in fixed income assets and, thus, minimize the
additional contributions. However, it is found that pension funds generally
invest around 40 to 60 percent of their portfolio in equities. Bodie et al. [1999]
find three reasons for these equity investments. First, a sponsor sees the de-
fined benefit fund more like defined contribution fund: a sponsor may believe
that a successful strategy may lead to extra benefits and tries to maximize
benefits paid to employees. Second, sponsor believes in market timing and
security selection ability. Third, a sponsor in financial distress may have an
incentive to invest in riskier assets. According to Blake [2001], fixed income
investments are encouraged by regulators simply because the discount rate
used in pension liability calculation by actuaries and accountants is based
on bond yields. This means that in order to avoid the short-term mismatch
between assets and liabilities, pension fund asset allocation should be more
heavily weighted toward bonds. In the U.S., pension funds have a special
tax treatment and this gives them incentive to create an asset mix with a
large spread between pretax and after-tax returns. Therefore, tax reasons
drive pension funds to invest more in bonds than in equities (Bodie et al.
[1999]). For a fully-funded healthy pension fund, Bodie [1988] recommends
investments only in taxable fixed-income securities.
Black [1989] studies the role of equities in the portfolio of a pension fund.
Stocks are used to achieve higher expected return, and therefore, meet the
pension obligation in the future while helping to lower expected pension
costs. Black [1989] acknowledges that some managers think about bonds
as the only answer to hedge their pension liabilities. However, stocks also
should be viewed as a hedge against a potential increase in pension liabilities.
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Stocks particularly hedge against the risk of salary inflation, which causes an
increase in liabilities. Black states that stock prices and the expected rate
of inflation move in tandem. This is called an ”economic” view of liabilities.
Black [1989] divides pension liability into two categories; a narrow view and
a broad view. Both of these liability types act like a security. The narrow
liability is defined as a present value of all vested benefits for current employ-
ees. Hence it is only tied to past and current while not including the future.
However, the narrow liability is only a snapshot of current work force, and
hence, the narrow liability is changing all of the time. Hedging for the type
of narrow liability is mainly performed using interest rate hedging methods
and therefore, the narrow view suggests investing in bonds to hedge the li-
abilities. According to Black, the broad liability is the present value of all
benefits to be paid, and therefore it is always greater than the narrow liabil-
ity. The broad liability is the narrow liability plus salary increases, benefits
to be accrued, changes in the benefits and additions to the workforce. In
most cases the broad view suggests investing in stocks is superior.
Also Chun et al. [2000] argue that a growing company typically should have
more equity investments, and less bonds or real-estate investments, due to the
higher expected rate of return of equity. Peskin [1997] argues that pension
fund’s equity exposure is critical to the future contribution cost. The equity
exposure varies between pension funds, and the optimal equity exposure to
each fund is found by using the following factors:
• noise in liabilities: if pension fund’s liabilities do not act like bonds (i.e.
the relationship between bonds and liabilities is volatile) and liabilities
have a lot of noise, then fund should have greater equity exposure;
• weight attached to surplus value: extraordinary equity returns generate
more surpluses;
• funded status of plan: the extreme funds, both poorly funded and well-
funded, should have larger equity exposures. Poorly funded funds need
the upside of equity investment and well funded funds have large buffer
to protect the future contributions from the downside risk.
• growth in workforce: a growing fund, with active liabilities growing
faster than retired liabilities, should have more equity exposure.
Stux [1995] divides pension fund portfolio management by using two steps.
First, a pension fund needs to decide which broad asset classes to invest in.
Typically, the asset classes include fixed income, equities, real estate, money
market instruments, venture capital and private investments.
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This step is called strategic asset allocation and it is the most important
part of a pension fund’s asset management, as the strategic asset allocation
decisions heavily affect the performance of a pension fund. The second step
includes the actual implementation of the chosen strategic asset allocation
by choosing internal or external fund managers, and putting in practice the
particular investment strategies and security selection process. This step is
also important, but has less influence on pension fund’s overall performance.
The liability structure of a pension fund defines how much risk the fund can
take. The risk can be divided into two categories: the risk of long-term
shortfall and the risk of near-term shortfall. One solution is to increase the
near-term shortfall risk, and leverage existing assets to gain higher long-term
return. This is called a short-term versus long-term dilemma: if the assets are
growing fast enough, they will not fall below liabilities in the long-term. How-
ever, the likelihood of a shortfall increases in short-term, as the asset/liability
relation is volatile. Another solution is to secure short-term needs, but that
risks long-term return. A traditional view suggests that pension fund should
only invest in a well-diversified fixed income portfolio, which can be duration-
matched with the liability stream. The bond investment is also suggested due
to the tax-advantages in some countries. Equity exposures are mainly for the
higher expected rate of return on equity investments. This upside potential
is especially needed in funds with younger participants, growing workforce
and when salary inflation is expected.
2.3 Optimal Asset Allocation
One of the frequent questions in finance is how to allocate a certain amount
of money in different assets and at what time instant. The earliest approach
to consider the optimal portfolio problem is the so-called mean-variance ap-
proach. It was pioneered by Markowitz [1952] and is basically a single-period
model which makes an one-off decision at the beginning of the period and
holds on until the end of the period.
Gradually, researchers extended this single-period model to continuous-time
models (Merton [1969], Merton [1971]). By applying results from stochastic
control theory (see 3.2.4) to the optimal portfolio problem, explicit solutions
have been obtained for some special cases. Using stochastic optimal control
theory, Merton was able to establish important financial economic princi-
ples. In the following section we recall the single-period model proposed by
Markowitz [1952]. Instead, in Chapter 3 we develop a continuous-time model
to get the optimal asset allocation in a Italian professional order pension fund.
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2.3.1 Optimal consumption decision versus the level of
interest rates
The value of financial assets is established in the capital markets, such as the
stock exchanges, or the bond markets. The issue of pricing of capital assets
is one of the central problems of modern financial theory. In the simplest
model of a capital market, a consumer exchanges current consumption for a
capital asset, which in turn is later exchanged for future consumption. The
exchanges are, of course, held with the use of the monetary unit of a given
national economy. In order to understand this process better, let us describe
the preferences of the consumer under consideration with a utility function
U(Ct+1;Ct) where Ct is the current consumption, and Ct+1 is the future con-
sumption.
The consumer’s problem is then to find the maximum of U(Ct+1;Ct) given
the income level of Yt and Yt+1 in the future.
Let us assume that the economy offers a market for exchanging today’s in-
come for future consumption, i.e., a capital market. If a unit of such a capital
asset has the price of Pt and if the consumer buys x units, then we must have:
Yt − x ∙ Pt = Ct
where the expression Ct is nonnegative and it denotes today’s consumption
(we will ignore the unrealistic possibility of zero consumption). If the unit of
the capital asset has the price of Pt+1 in the future, then
Yt+1 − x ∙ Pt+1 = Ct+1
Therefore, the consumer will maximize overall utility U(Yt− x ∙Pt;Yt+1− x ∙
Pt+1) by choosing an optimal level of x; if the utility function U is concave
and differentiable with respect to each of its variables, then by differentiating
U with respect to x we obtain the following expression for the optimal level
of x:
dU
dx
= − ∂U
∂Ct
Pt +
∂U
∂Ct+1
Pt+1 = 0 (2.1)
Under certain assumptions this optimization problem may have a solution
on the boundary of the domain of the problem function, resulting in zero
consumption, but we have decided to ignore this unrealistic solution. In all
other cases, 2.1 is a necessary and sufficient condition for the optimal division
of income between consumption and investment.
The condition 2.1 is actually equivalent to:
∂U
∂Ct+1
− ∂U
∂Ct
=
Pt
Pt+1
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Using the economic terminology, the above equation has the following inter-
pretation. The marginal utility of future consumption has the same relation-
ship to today’s consumption as today’s price of a capital asset has to the
price of the said capital asset in the future.
It should be also noted that the ratio Pt
Pt+1
is equal to the absolute value of
the derivative dCt+1
dCt
.
Fig. 2.2: Consumer’s consumption decision
The choices available to the consumer are presented in 2.2. The optimal
point is the point of tangency of an indifference curve (a curve connecting all
points with the same level of U(Ct+1;Ct) and the line given by the equation:
Ct+1 = Yt+1 + (Yt − Ct) ∙ Pt+1
Pt
(2.2)
obtained from the equations expressing division of income between consump-
tion and investment at time t; and its consequences at time t+1; after elimi-
nating the variable x: this is implied by the fact that the points lying on the
line 2.2 represent all possible decisions of the consumer, while between two
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indifference curves, the one giving higher utility lies further North-East.
The quantity i = (Pt+1
Pt
)− 1 is the rate of return offered by the capital asset.
If the price of a capital asset is deterministic, we call the rate of return the
risk-free rate. In reality, however, most future prices and rates of return are
quite uncertain. This uncertainty is the source of risk of capital assets. We
will return to this subject later in this chapter.
Global optimization for all consumers creates the supply of savings in the
economy, given by the function
x∗(Yt;Yt+1; i)
which determines the value of non-consumed income in relation to consumers’
income today and in the future, and to the interest rate.
The other element creating the equilibrium in the economy is the demand
for savings. That function is created as follows: for a given interest rate,
the firms undertake those projects, which have a positive net present value,
and reject those that have a negative net present value. The total demand
is the sum of all funds needed for the projects with positive net present
value. Of course, in reality this process is much more complex, as the savings
plans of the consumers, as well as the projects undertaken by the firms have
varying time horizons, and this causes the existence of various interest rates
for various time horizons (this is called the yield curve or term structure
of interest rates). Furthermore, there is a great uncertainty concerning the
returns of the projects undertaken by the firms. This causes the value of
capital assets, representing the right to income from the capital investment
projects, to fluctuate because of the riskiness of such income, and changing
risk preferences of the capital markets investors. We will attempt to address
this issue now.
2.3.2 Optimization of an investment portfolio: Markowitz’s
model
Markowitz [1952] created the first theory of capital markets that included a
consideration for the risk of capital assets. We will present the outline of his
theory, commonly called the Modern Portfolio Theory.
In the model of Markowitz it is assumed that the rate of return of a capital
asset is a random variable R. We assume that the securities market consists of
N elements with random rates of return R1; . . . ;RN . The buyers and sellers
of capital assets, called investors, allocate their resources to a portfolio of
assets. For a given investor, the portions of this investor’s portfolio invested
in each of the available assets are x1; . . . ; xN . Thus the rate of return of the
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portfolio, also a random variable, is
Rx =
N∑
j=1
xjRj (2.3)
where x = (x1; . . . ; xN)
>. Markowitz assumed that the preferences of the
investors can be summarized with the expected value and the standard de-
viation of the rate of return of the portfolio. The standard deviation (or
variance) is the measure of risk in this model. Let us note that
E(Rx) =
N∑
j=1
xjE(Rj) (2.4)
and that
V ar(Rx) =
N∑
l=1
N∑
j=1
xlxjCov(Rl;Rj) (2.5)
Markowitz assumed that every investor’s objective is to maximize the ex-
pected value of the rate of return of the portfolio, and to minimize the stan-
dard deviation (or the variance) of that rate of return.
Only in rare situations one can find a portfolio, which indeed has both the
highest expected rate of return and the lowest variance. In reality, however,
most research in modern finance tends to predict that on average instruments
with higher rates of return tend to have higher degree of risk, as described by
the standard deviation. Thus, in practice, it takes some more work to find
an optimal portfolio.
A portfolio will be called efficient if there is no other portfolio with a higher
expected rate of return and lower variance. Thus, efficient portfolios are
maximal elements in the set of all portfolios with respect to the partial order
given by simultaneous increasing of the expected return and decreasing of
the variance of the rate of return. In the model studied here, such maximal
elements, i.e., efficient portfolios, always exist. In order to find them, one
usually assumes that the investor aims to minimize the following expression:
V ar(Rx)− 2τE(Rx) (2.6)
where τ > 0 is the risk tolerance coefficient for the investor (defined as the
first derivative of the utility function divided by the absolute value of the
second derivative of the utility function). This minimization is performed
under the constraint:
∑N
j=1 xj = 1. Negative values of the xj coefficients are
allowed and refer to short position in a given security.
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A short sale is a sale of a security, which is borrowed (from a broker), with
that security replaced later by a purchase (covering of a short). Short sale
requires a deposit (margin deposit) of a certain amount of money (typically
50% of the amount received from the sale of the security). This margin
deposit may, or may not, earn interest with the broker. The money received
from the sale generally does not earn interest, and is held with the broker
until the short is covered. A short sale creates new supply of the security
shorted, so if the shorted security pays income (e.g., dividends) that income
must be produced by the short seller, in order for the holder of the newly
created security to receive such income. An issue that arises in short sales is
the calculation of the rate of return received by the short seller. In such a
calculation, we should note that the rate of return is determined by the initial
cash outlay of the investor, and the final cash flow received at the end, when
the short is covered, as well as possible intermediate cash flows of dividends
paid by the investor and interest received.
General formula for the effective yield earned over the period of investment
is
i =
P + I −D
M
where the symbols have the following meanings: M is the margin requirement
(initial cash outlay by the short seller), D the amount of dividends paid by
the short seller to the newly created security’s owner, I the amount of interest
earned by the short seller on the margin deposit (assuming there is no interest
earned on the cash received from the initial short sale, if there is such interest,
then it must be added here), and P the profit on the short sale transaction,
i.e., sale proceeds short covering repurchase cost.
In order to find the desired minimum of the expression 2.6, we create the
Lagrangian
L(x, λ) = V ar(Rx)− 2τE(Rx)− λ(e>x− 1)
where e = (1; . . . ; 1)> is the unit vector in RN ; and e>x is the scalar product
(also known as the dot product) in the same space. The parameter λ is a
Lagrange multiplier. The minimization problem for 2.6 under the constraint∑N
j=1 xj = 1 may be reduced to the unconstrained minimization of L(x;λ).
In fact, assume that there is a λ ∈ R and xj ∈ RN such that e>x = 1 and
for every x ∈ RN
L(x;λ) ≥ L(xl;λ) = V ar(Rxl)− 2τE(Rxl)
If e>x = 1, then from the above inequality we infer that
V ar(Rx)− 2τE(Rx) ≥ V ar(Rxl)− 2τE(Rxl)
60
Therefore xl also minimizes 2.6 on the set of x ∈ RN such that e>x = 1.
Since the Lagrangian
L(x;λ) =
N∑
l=1
N∑
j=1
xlxjCov(Rl;Rj)− 2τ
N∑
j=1
xjE(Rj)− λ
(
N∑
j=1
xj − 1
)
,
is a convex function, it follows from the Kuhn Tucker Theorem that the
necessary and sufficient condition for it to have a minimum at x is that the
gradient ∇L(.;λ) for x is a zero-vector and that e>x = 1. Since
∂L(x;λ)
∂xk
= 2
N∑
l=1
xlCov(Rl;Rj)− 2τE(Rk − λ
the necessary and sufficient condition for L to reach its minimum at x under
the constraint e>x = 1, therefore, becomes a system of N + 1 equations
{
2
∑N
l=1 xlCov(Rl;Rj)− 2τE(Rk − λ = 0 fork = 1, 2, . . . , N
e>x = 1
(2.7)
in which there are also N + 1 unknowns, x1; . . . ; xN and λ. If we use the
notation Σ = [Cov(Rl;Rj)] and μ = [E(R1),E(R2), . . . ,E(RN)]> then the
system of equations 2.7 can be written in the following vector form:{
2Σx− 2τμ− λe = 0
e>x = 1
(2.8)
where 0 = (0, . . . , 0)> is an N-dimensional vertical vector with all coordi-
nates equal to zero.
Assume now that
• the matrix Σ = [Cov(Rl;Rj)] is positive definite;
• the vectors e and μ are linearly independent.
If we substitute τ = 0 in 2.7 then we can easily get{
xmin = λ
2
Σ−1e
e>xmin = 1
(2.9)
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where xmin is the solution of 2.7 under the condition that τ = 0.
Let us multiply the left-hand side of the vector equation in 2.9 by e> and
calculate that λ
2
= (e>Σ−1e)−1 This eventually gives us
xmin =
Σ−1e
e>Σ−1e
We can proceed in an analogous fashion for τ > 0 and obtain a general
solution x∗ of the system of 2.7.
x∗ =
Σ−1e
e>Σ−1e
+ τ
(
Σ−1μ− e
>Σ−1μ
e>Σ−1e
Σ−1e
)
Let us use this notation:
z∗ = Σ−1μ− e
>Σ−1μ
e>Σ−1e
Σ−1e
and note that
e>z∗ = 0
Therefore the solution of the problem of portfolio optimization is the set of
efficient portfolios of the following form:{
x∗ = xmin + τz∗, τ ≥ 0 (2.10)
where xmin is the solution obtained under the constraint τ = 0, giving
the portfolio of minimum variance, while z∗ is a vector dependent on the ex-
pected values and covariances of returns of securities available in the market
such that e>z∗ = 0.
We say that the portfolio z∗ is self-financing, as all long positions (i.e., secu-
rities owned in the portfolio) in it are created with funds obtained from short
positions in it.
We also have
E(Rx∗) = E(Rxmin) + τE(Rz∗)
and
V ar(Rx∗) = V ar(Rxmin) + τ
2E(Rz∗) (2.11)
The first of the above equalities is obtained from ?? and 2.10. It can be
shown easily, by using the definitions of z∗ and xmin, that
(xmin)>Σz∗ = 0
and this completes the proof of the equality ??.
The set of efficient portfolios in the plane, which has the portfolio variance
on the x-axis and the expected return of a portfolio on the y-axis, is called
the efficient frontier. This set is a parabola (see 2.3). If, instead, we place
the standard deviation of the portfolio return on the x-axis, then the efficient
frontier so created is a hyperbola.
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Fig. 2.3: Efficient frontier
2.4 Risks faced by a pension fund
The key objective of a pension plan is a secure delivery of pension benefits
to the plan participants. The plan sponsor has a choice of a variety of fund-
ing methods and risk management strategies. All actuarial funding methods
have one characteristic in common: they require that at least some of the
future liabilities of the plan are financed with capital assets purchased to-
day. A pension plan has assets in the form of financial instruments, while its
liabilities are set actuarially in relation to benefits granted. While holding
securities as assets is designed to assure delivery of benefits, it does become
a source of additional risks for the plan.
What kind of risks does a pension plan face? The Society of Actuaries Com-
mittee on Valuation and Related Matters (1979) charged with, among others,
this question, defined the following three key kinds of risks faced by a life or
annuity insurance enterprise.
• C1 risk: asset default and depreciation risk, i.e., the risk of suffering
losses in equities or bond losses due to credit risk (but not due to
interest rate risk). This is an asset-side risk.
• C2 risk: pricing risk, i.e., the risk that the product issued by the finan-
cial intermediary has been issued at an inappropriate price (e.g., it did
not provide the intermediary with proper compensation for risks that
the intermediary has assumed). This is a liabilities-side risk.
• C3 risk: interest rate risk or, more generally, asset-liability management
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risk, i.e., the risk that assets and liabilities of the intermediary may
respond differently to changes in market prices or indexes (notably,
changes in interest rates).
• C4 risk: the general business risk, caused by the management, political
and regulatory environment, or other socio-economic factors.
The level of C1 risk is a function of the investment policy assumed by the
intermediary. In the case of insurance companies and pension plans, C2 risk
is clearly the responsibility of an actuary. For a pension plan, plan liabilities
may turn out to be higher than assumed, due to factors such as mortality,
salaries, withdrawal, or retirement pattern, diverging from the actuarial as-
sumptions used in valuation. But the asset-liability management risk C3 is
a function of how an intermediary manages its assets and liabilities together.
Such integrated comprehensive risk management is a relatively new idea in
the management of financial intermediaries.
The key issue of asset-liability management is the question of whether assets
and liabilities exhibit similar behavior when market conditions change, and
if their behavior is different, whether the financial intermediary is compen-
sated properly for assuming that risk. Furthermore, an intermediary should
be able to understand and control the risk assumed (see Artzner et al. [1999]).
Clearly, an intermediary cannot control the level of interest rates. However,
one of the main objectives of asset liability management is to create a com-
prehensive and integrated policy of dealing with the changes in interest rates.
Interest rate risk can cause insolvency of a financial intermediary. For a pen-
sion plan we arrive at the following Principle of Asset Liability Management:
Asset liability management, and interest rate risk manage-
ment in particular, for a pension plan, should be based on the
principle that either assets and liabilities should behave in the
same way under changing market conditions, or if they diverge
under changing market conditions, the pension plan managers
should understand that risk, be able to control it, and be com-
pensated for assuming it.
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Chapter 3
A quantitative model for
optimal asset allocation in a
PAYGO pension fund under
financial and actuarial risk
The first rule is not to lose.
The second rule is not to forget the first rule.
Warren Buffet
3.1 Research questions and research method-
ology and methods
3.1.1 Research questions
The purpose of this thesis is precisely to identify the optimal dynamic in-
vestment strategy (i.e. the optimal asset allocation rebalancing rule over a
certain time span) as a function of the portfolio manager’s targets in a PAYG
pension plan (such as an Italian Professional Order pension fund). In partic-
ular, we consider that the portfolio optimization problem faced in this case
presents time-varying market returns (financial risk) and most of all, it is a
long-term investor problem (see Brennan et al. [1997], Blake et al. [2000],
Haberman and Sung [1994], Hainaut [2006], Menoncin [2002]). In general,
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the problem of long-term investments is a well-established research field in-
troduced by Samuelson [1969] and Merton [1969], Merton [1971]. Since then,
it is well understood that a short-term portfolio optimization can be very
different from long-term portfolio optimization. In this chapter, continuous-
time modeling along the lines of Merton [1971] is pursued.
Moreover, the proposed model entails another source of risk, typically faced
by a pension fund: actuarial risk. This comes from the possibility that the
assumptions that actuaries implement to manage a specific pension plan may
turn out wrong or somewhat inaccurate. In particular, we deal with assump-
tions concerning future cash flows coming from expected contributions and
benefits making them random rather then deterministic.
Furthermore, we believe that, in dealing with a PAYG pension fund, is par-
ticulary important to take expressly into account the sustainability of the
fund, i.e. the balance between the active and retired members. To express
this concept in a mathematical way, we ground on an empiric indicator to
measure the financial sustainability of a pension funds, expressed by the ratio
of the fund value to the current expenditure for pensions. The Italian legisla-
tion proposes, as indicator for the retirement funds of the professional orders,
the ratio of the fund value to 5 times the current expenditure for pensions.
In the model, we assume that the asset manager tries, on the one hand, to
maximize the above mentioned ratio and, on the other hand, to keep it in
equilibrium in order to avoid useless extreme speculative investments.
Over the past few years, a vast literature regarding demographic risks and
the sustainability in public PAYG system has been developed (see Feldstein
[1996] ; Feldstein [2005]) on the reform of the Social Security in the USA).
Pemberton [2000] analyzes the transition from PAYG to funded pensions.
Sinn [2000] and Blake [2000] illustrate the characteristics and the differences
between PAYG and funded system (for further details on this topic see Can-
nas et al. [2010]). There are few contributions on private PAYG scheme.
Ferrara [2002] analyzes the equilibrium of a PAYG pension fund with de-
fined benefit, where new entrants are random variables depending on the
employment rate. Menoncin [2005] studies the allocation problem for a pen-
sion fund, which behaves according to a PAYG rule: considering the total
number of workers and pensioners as random variables. He shows how the
demographic risk affects the optimal portfolio in a cyclical way. Melis and
Trudda [2009] propose a model for the evolution of a PAYG pension fund,
with stochastic new entrants and global asset return.
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3.1.2 research methodology
The whole research carried out in this work is based on a positive-deductive
methodology. Deductive reasoning works from the more general to the more
specific, sometimes this is informally called a ”top-down” approach. Conclu-
sions follows logically from premises. As we have pointed out above, this
work is based on arguments founded on rules and accepted principles (e.g.
to describe asset manager preferences or financial market behaviour) which
are generally used for deductive reasoning. From an epistemological point of
view, this research can be assessed as taking a positivist position that advo-
cates the application of the methods of the natural sciences to the study of
the social reality an beyond. For further details on business research methods
the reader is referred to Bryman and Bell [2007].
Doubtless, many quantitative methods represented the real toolbox to per-
form this research, the most of them comes from mathematical theory.
The next section is devoted to a detailed presentation of the mathematical
methods used to construct the model presented in Section 3.3. According to
the random nature of the variable that come into play in this research, we
have made a large use of instruments coming from probability theory (see
Bjo¨rk [2008], Oksendal [2003]).
3.2 Mathematical methods
3.2.1 Stochastic processes
Definition 1. A stochastic process W (t) is called Brownian motion if it
satisfies the following conditions:
1. Independence: W (t + Δt) − W (t) is independent of {W (τ)} for all
τ ≤ t;
2. Stationarity: The distribution of W (t+Δt)−W (t) does not depend on
t;
3. Continuity: limΔt→0
P (|W (t+Δt)−W (t)|≥δ)
Δt
= 0 for all δ > 0
Please note that the third assumption is expressed with probabilities: dis-
continuities in sample functions can only occur with probability zero. Hence,
there is a version of the Brownian motion with all sample functions continu-
ous.
This definition induces the distribution of the process W (t).
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Theorem 1 (Normally distributed increments of Brownian motion). If W (t)
is a Brownian motion, then W (t)−W (0) is a normal random variable with
mean μt and variance σ2t, where μ and σ are constant real numbers.
As a result of this theorem, we have the following density function of a
Brownian motion:
fW (t)(x) =
1√
2πσ2t
e−
(x−μt)2
2σ2t (3.1)
An irritating property of Brownian motion is that its sample paths are not
differentiable. This is easily verified in the mean-square sense:
E
[(
W (t+Δt)−W (t)
Δt
)2]
=
E[(W (t+Δt)−W (t))2]
Δt2
=
σ2
Δt2
(3.2)
This diverges for Δt→ 0 and therefore W ()˙ is not differentiable in L2.
The Brownian motion W ()˙ (starting at W (0) = 0) has many more bizarre
and intriguing properties. Some of them are listed below:
• Autocovariance function: E(W (t)− μt)(W (τ)− μτ) = σ2min(t, τ )
• V ar
{
W (t)
t
}
= σ
2
t
• limt→∞ W (t)−μtt = 0 with probability 1
• The total variation of the Brownian motion over a finite interval [0, T ]
is infinite.
• The ”sum of squares” of a drift-free Brownian motion is deterministic:
limN→∞
∑N
k=1(W (k ∙ TN ) − W ((k − 1) ∙ TN ))2 = σ2T . Important con-
sequence: Whenever the term dW 2 appears in a stochastic differential
equation, it should be replaced by σ2dt.
• Zero-crossings: In a finite interval [0, T ], every sample of a drift-free
Brownian motion has infinitely many zero-crossings. The set of zero-
crossings is dense in [0, T ], i.e., no sample path has isolated zero-
crossings.
Definition 2 (Standard Brownian motion). A Brownian motion is called
standard if:
W (0) = 0 (3.3)
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E[W (t)] = 0 (μ = 0) (3.4)
E[W 2(t)] = t (σ2 = 1) (3.5)
In the sequel, a Brownian motion is assumed to be a standard Brow-
nian motion unless explicitly stated otherwise. In most cases, we use the
differential form
dW (t) = lim
τ→0
W (t+ τ) (3.6)
with E[dW (t)] = 0and the sum-of-squares property E[dW 2(t)] = dt The
generalization of a Brownian motion from the scalar case to the vector case
is straightforward: The scalar drift parameter μ becomes a vector; and the
”volatility parameter”σ and the ”intensity parameter”σ2 become symmetric,
positive-definite matrices. The notation in the vector case will be Σ instead
of σ2 and Σ1/2 instead of σ. In the case of a vector-valued standard Brownian
motion, it will be assumed that the component processes of the vector are
mutually independent.
3.2.2 Stochastic differential equations
A non-standard Brownian motion X(Δ) satisfies the stochastic differential
equation
dX(t) = μdt+ σdW (t) (3.7)
X(0) = 0 (3.8)
where W (Δ) is a standard Brownian motion.
The geometric Brownian motion X(Δ) is described by the differential equa-
tion
dX(t) = μX(t)dt+ σX(t)dW (t) (3.9)
It is popular in financial engineering for modeling stock prices.
In the most general nonlinear case, the stochastic differential equation for a
stochastic process can be written as follows:
dX(t) = f(t,X(t))dt+ g(t,X(t))dW (t) (3.10)
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3.2.3 Stochastic calculus
Due to the ”sum-of-squares” property of the Brownian motion, the rules of
differentiation in the stochastic case differ from those in the deterministic
case.
Consider the following problem: given a stochastic differential equation for
the process X()˙
dX(t) = f(t,X(t))dt+ g(t,X(t))dW (t) (3.11)
X(t0) = X0 (3.12)
find the differential equation for the process Y (t) which is a function of
X(t),
Y (t) = φ(t,X(t)) (3.13)
where the function φ(t,X(t)) is continuously differentiable in t and twice
continuously differentiable in X.
Let us do a Taylor series expansion of 3.13 up to second-order terms:
dY (t) = φt(t,X)dt+ φX(t,X)[f(t,X(t))dt+ g(t,X(t))dW (t)] +
1
2
φtt(t,X)dt
2+
1
2
φXX(t,X)[f(t,X(t))dt+ g(t,X(t))dW (t)]
2 + φtX(t,X)[f(t,X(t))dt+
g(t,X(t))dW (t)]dt+ h.o.t.
(3.14)
Notice that the term dW 2(t) appears when the square factor of φtt(t,X)
is expanded. Replacing it by dt and retaining only the terms of first order
yield the following result:
dY (t) = [φt(t,X) + φX(t,X)f(t,X(t))+
1
2
φXX(t,X)g
2(t,X(t))dt
+φX(t,X)g(t,X(t))dW (t)
(3.15)
Y (t0, X0) = φ(t0, X(t0)) (3.16)
3.2.4 Stochastic optimal control
In this section, the following stochastic optimal control problem is considered
for a dynamic system with the state vector x(t) ∈ Rn, the admissible control
vector u(t) ∈ U ⊆ Rm (where U is a time-invariant, convex, and closed subset
of Rm, and the standard vector Brownian motion W (t) ∈ Rk.
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Problem: for the dynamic system described by the stochastic differential
equation
dx(t) = f(x(t), u(t))dt+ g(x(t), u(t))dW (t)dW (t) (3.17)
with the given deterministic initial state x0 at the fixed initial time t0,
x(t0) = x0 (3.18)
find a piecewise continuous control vector u(t) ∈ U for all times t in the fixed
time interval [t0, t1], such that the objective functional
J = E
[
K(x(t1)) +
∫ t1
t0
L(x(t), u(t))dt
]
(3.19)
is maximized.
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman Theory :
Theorem 2 (Stochastic Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman Theorem). If the partial
differential equation
−Jt(x, t) = max
u∈U
[
L(x(t), u(t)) + Jxf(x, u) + 1
2
tr(Jxx(x, t)g(x, u)g>(x, u))
]
(3.20)
with the boundary condition
J (x(t1)) = K(x)
admits a unique solution, the globally optimal state feedback control law is
u(x, t) = argmax
u∈U
[
L(x(t), u(t)) + Jxf(x, u) + 1
2
tr(Jxx(x, t)g(x, u)g>(x, u))
]
(3.21)
3.3 The model
In this section we have solved the optimal asset allocation problem for a
pension fund which operates in a PAYG system and periodically revises its
investment strategies. We assume that the fund manager is concerned with
guarantee the sustainability (stated by a certain sustainability ratio St) of
the fund wealth and, at the same time, he has to face fund’s risk exposure.
The variable St is observable and we use the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman frame-
work to find the optimal investment strategy for the pension fund.
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3.3.1 The financial market
Let us consider a financial market consisting of different assets, such as stocks,
bonds with different maturities, or various other kinds of financial assets; the
main objective is that of deriving the dynamics of the so-called self-financing
portfolio. In such a financial market, time is continuous and trading takes
place continuously and frictionless.
At any time t ∈ [0, T ], where T is the length of the fund manager’s investment
horizon, we consider a financial market composed of n (n > 1) risky assets
F1t, F2t, ∙ ∙ ∙ , Fit, ∙ ∙ ∙ , Fnt 1 ≤ i ≤ n
driven by geometric Brownian motions
dFit = miFitdt+
n∑
j=1
σijFitdW
Fi
it
where
Fi0,mi, σij ∈ R+. (W Fiit )t≥0 is a Brownian motion defined on a probability
space (ΩF ,FF , P F ) where (FF )t≥0) is the filtration generated by (W Ft )t≥0.
The (n, n) matrix of σi,j is noted s and is the Choleski’s decomposition of the
variance-covariance matrix of the assets Σ = σ>σ.
3.3.2 Contributions and pensions
We assume that the stream of contributions Γt and benefits Bt is stochastic
and modeled by Geometric Brownian motions. We recall that contributions
and benefits are respectively positive and negative cash flows. In particular,
we denote with dΓt e dBt the dynamic of the payment process related respec-
tively to contributions and benefits of all living members at a certain time
t:
dΓ = μΓ(t)Γtdt+ σΓ(t)ΓtdW
L
t (3.22)
dB = μB(t)Btdt+ σB(t)BtdW
L
t (3.23)
where μΓ(t), μB(t), σΓ(t) e σB(t) are time functions and (W
L
t )t≥0 is a
Brownian motion defined on the probability space (ΩL,FL, PL). Moreover,
let define a reserve of the fund as
Rt = α ∙ Bt (3.24)
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where α ∈ R. This stochastic variable is introduced to take into account
the Italian legislation indicator for the retirement funds of the professional
orders, that is the ratio of the fund value to a multiple of the current expen-
diture for pensions, here stated as the reserve Rt.
By applying Ito’s lemma to (3.24), we obtain the dynamic of Rt:
dRt = μB(t)Rtdt+ σB(t)RtdW
L
t (3.25)
3.3.3 The managed wealth and the sustainability ratio
Given the n-dimensional price process {Ft}t≥0, a Markovian relative portfolio
strategy is any n-dimensional process {Πt}t≥0 of the form Πt = Π(t, Ft) for
some function Π : R+ × Rn → Rn.
Let the FLt -adapted one-dimensional consumption process be {Bt − Γt}t≥0.
The fund wealth is the value process of a self-financing portfolio-consumption,
whose stochastic differential equation is
dAt =
(
m>ΠtAtΓt − Bt
)
dt+ AtΠ
>
t σdW
F
t (3.26)
where m> is the n-vector containing expected asset returns (transpose
matrix of m), σ is the (n× n) assets covariance matrix.
The proportion of At invested in the i
th risky asset at time t is denoted πit.
We assume that this constraint holds:
πNt = 1−
N−1∑
i=1
πit
Let us define the sustainability ratio St:
St =
At
Rt
(3.27)
We obtain St’s dynamic in this way:
dSt = d
At
Rt
= At ∙ d
(
1
Rt
)
+
1
Rt
∙ dAt (3.28)
where
d
(
1
Rt
)
= − 1
Rt
∙ [(μB(t)− σB(t)2) dt+ σB(t)dWLt ] (3.29)
Substituing 3.26 and 3.29 in 3.28, we obtain:
dSt =
((
m>Πt − μP (t) + σP (t)2
)
St +
1
α
(Ψ− 1)
)
dt+
(
Π>t σdW
F
t − σP (t)dWLt
)
St
(3.30)
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where
Ψt =
Γt
Bt
(3.31)
3.3.4 The fund objective function
We define the pension fund asset manager optimization problem as: ∀t ∈
[0, T ]
V (St,Ψt, t) = max
Πt∈Rn
E
[∫ T
0
U(St)dt
]
(3.32)
s.t.
dSt =
(
(m>Πt + μB(t) + σB(t)2)St +
1
α
(Ψt − 1)
)
dt+σΠ>StdW F−σB(t)StdWL
(3.33)
dΨt = Ψt
(
μΓ(t)− μB(t) + σΓ(t)2 − σΓ(t) ∙ σB(t)
)
dt+(σΓ(t)− σB(t))ΨtdWLt
(3.34)
S(0) = S0
Ψ(0) = Ψ0
πnt = 1−
n−1∑
i=1
πit
We assume that the fund manager seeks to maximize continuously the utility
arising from the sustainability ratio, via an adapted investment policy Πt,
which is the control variable of our model. The preferences of the manager are
reflected by a quadratic utility function having two components. A first one,
proportional to the sustainability ratio, is related to the fact that the fund
manager wants to maximize the sustainability ratio. The second component,
proportional to the square of the difference between the sustainability ratio
and a benchmark time dependant ratio TS(t), penalizes the spread between
the current ratio and a target one. Utility function is:
U(St) = kSt − (1− k)(St − TS(t))2
where k ∈ [0, 1] and TS(t) is a deterministic function. In order to establish
the relation between the value function and the optimal investment policy,
we try to solve Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman’s equation.
Hypothesis:
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• there exists an optimal control law Πt
• the optimal value function V (St,Ψt, t) is regular in the sense that V ∈
C2,2,1
For all fixed vector π, the partial differential equation operator L is defined
by:
V (St,Ψt, t) satisfy the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation:{
Vt + supπt [U(St) + LπV ] = 0
V (T, s, ψ) = U(ST )
(3.35)
The control is πt:
Πt =M1πt +M2 (3.35)
3.3.5 The optimal dynamic portfolio strategy
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Chapter 4
An application to an Italian
Professional Order pension
fund
Just as eating against one’s will is injurious to health, so study without a
liking for it spoils the memory, and it retains nothing it takes in.
Leonardo Da Vinci
4.1 Data
In order to give a numerical illustration of the model developed in the pre-
vious chapter, we take data from a real Italian Professional Order pension
fund. Our model parameters are related both to the pension fund calculus
performed by the actuary and to the financial market data. The next sections
are dedicated to show the paratemers we used in this numerical example.
4.1.1 Pension Fund data
The pension fund financial situation can be summarized by the parameters
written in Table 4.1. As we can see, the asset manager has to manage an
huge amount of money.
Moreover, we assume that the asset manager set an investment horizon of
ten years (T = 10), and that current benefits multiplier α = 5. To describe
an asset manager averse to risk we set the risk aversion coefficient k = 0.1.
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Table 4.1: Data on an Italian Professional Order pension fund (year 2009,
in Euros)
Pension fund’s wealth (A) 1.600.000.000
Contributions (Γ) 423.898.092
Benefits (B) 365.481.348
S (A/5B˙) 0.88
Ψ (Γ/B) 1.16
Figures from 4.1 to 4.6 represent the other parameters related to the fund
that we described in the previous chapter.
Fig. 4.1: Expected average benefits’ path
4.2 Results
This section is devoted to show the optimal allocation law for each of the 12
asset classes presented in the previous section. We present surfaces graphs
in which we can find the optimal number of shares for every asset class in
every point of time and for every sustainability level.
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Fig. 4.2: Expected average contributions’ path
Fig. 4.3: Average contributions and benefits’ paths
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Fig. 4.4: Volatility range of benefits’ path
Fig. 4.5: Volatility range of contributions’ path
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Fig. 4.6: Target sustainability ratio’s path
Fig. 4.7: Monetary
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Fig. 4.8: Bonds Governments EMU
Fig. 4.9: Bond Governments World ex EMU
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Fig. 4.10: Bonds Corporations EMU
Fig. 4.11: Bonds Corporations USA
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Fig. 4.12: Bond Corporation High Yield
Fig. 4.13: Bond Corporation Emerging Markets
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Fig. 4.14: Inflation
Fig. 4.15: Equity EU
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Fig. 4.16: Equity USA
Fig. 4.17: Equity Pacific
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
The aim of a pension system is to provide funds for pensioners to live with-
out significant differences with the working period. In the past twenty years,
several reforms have affected the public retirement systems prevailing in Eu-
ropean countries, including Italy. It has been argued that the decreasing
birthrate and the rising life expectancy would make unsustainable such sys-
tems where presently active workers pay for the pension of presently alive
retirees. On the other hand, in a system based upon individual investment
plans in financial markets, workers face a high uncertainty on their future
pension wealth: their assets may suffer important drawdowns once they re-
tire, thus drastically reducing their standards of living as retirees. There is
therefore a need for a collective institution (Pension funds) able to insure
present and future retirees and provide a smoothing of retirement benefits
over time by sharing these risks over several generations.
Italy is facing a demographic challenge substantially greater than the average
for all the countries of the European Union. Currently, the Italian pension
system consists of three pillars: mandatory public old age insurance, supple-
mentary collective pension funds and private individual insurance annuities.
This thesis focuses in particular on the pension funds of professional orders.
They are part of the fist pillar, but are now private self-managed companies,
continuing to operate according to a PAYG financing mechanism. As often
highlighted in this thesis, this is an anomaly because private closed schemes
are usually funded and included in second pillar. In this particular system
the financial self-sufficiency is certainly guaranteed only in the initial phase,
because there are many contributors and no actual pensioners. In the long
run it is necessary for the financial sustainability of the pension plan that the
number of pensioners remains proportional to the number of workers. If the
ratio active/retired decreases, the increase in the financial burden can entail
a situation of financial disequilibrium. This is most relevant for the retire-
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ment funds of each specific professional order for which, unlike in a public
system, there is indeed no intergroup compensation.
In analyzing the risks of a pension plan there are of course many crucial
issues. Pension funds, just as other financial intermediaries, such as banks,
insurance companies, or mutual funds, typically hold financial assets on the
asset side of their balance sheet. Such assets are held for investment purposes,
i.e., they are held in order to produce future income for plan participants.
The board of the pension fund is involved Ii investment policy, i.e. it decides
about the asset classes in which the fund invests its wealth. Asset allocation
is the process of choosing among possible asset classes.
A large part of financial planning consists of finding an asset allocation that
is appropriate for a given investor in terms of their appetite for and ability
to shoulder risk. This can depend on various factors. Asset Allocation is
the product of an examination of an investor’s needs and objectives. Asset
allocation, done well, is a plan to invest in assets or asset classes which will
best meet the needs and objectives of the investor. Investors seeking high
returns and willing to expose their investments to an elevated amount of risk
will allocate to equity (ownership) investments. Investors seeking stability
and income will allocate to debt investments. Most investors, particularly
personal investors, will find mixtures of equity and debt investments most
nearly meets their needs. Asset Allocation can be practised by optimization
techniques, minimizing risk for a given level of return or maximising return
for a given level of risk. It also can be accomplished as goal based investing.
The exposure to losses of a financial market investment can badly fall on
pension fund wealth, so without a careful analysis of the potential danger,
the investment could cause catastrophical consequence at the worst. With
the experience of recent failure of large financial institutions, sufficient risks
control measures are clearly essential and the regulators have set restrictions
on limiting the exposure to market risks.
Moreover, pension funds world entails another source of risk: actuarial risk.
This comes from the possibility that certain assumptions implemented to
manage a specific pension plan may turn out wrong or somewhat inaccurate.
In particular, we deal with assumptions concerning future cash flows coming
from expected contributions and benefits.
This thesis has proposed a quantitative model to solve the optimal dy-
namic asset allocation problem faced by the pension fund asset manager. In
our model we address both financial and actuarial sources of risk (financial
market returns, contributions and benefits are random variables) and we take
into account also the sustainability of the plan, which is both a key indicator
to manage the fund and a tool of control used by regulators.
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In a first step, we detail a quantitative method to determine the optimal
investment policy performed by a fund manager who tries to maximize the
pension scheme’s sustainability . The optimal asset allocation is precisely
determined continuously over a certain time horizon and for every sustain-
ability lavel.
In a second step, we apply our model to an Italian pension fund in order to
give a numerical illustration of the proposed model.
The methodology presented in this work can probably be applied to a
wider range of problem than the one developed in this thesis. There is still
interesting issues that motives further researches. For e.g. it can be interest-
ing to restrict the optimal portfolio law in order to avoid short seeling of the
asset managed. . . . of the fund to the market risk.
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Appendix A
Some basic elements of
Probability Theory
The reader is referred to ? and ? We call probability space the triple (Ω,F , P )
where
1. Ω 6= ∅ is a set called sample ? space. By a financial point of view, it
represents every possible state of the market.
2. F is a σ − algebra, i.e. a family of subsets of Ω with the following
properties:
(a) ∅ ∈ F
(b) if A ∈ F ⇒ AC ∈ F
(c) A1, A2, ∙ ∙ ∙ ∈ F ⇒ A :=
⋃∞
n=1Ai ∈ F
The subsets F of Ω which belong to F are called F −measurable sets.
Ina probability context these sets are called events
3. P is a probability measure on a measurable space (Ω,F). P is a function
P : F −→ [0, 1] such that:
(a) P (∅) = 0
(b) P (Ω) = 1
(c) if {Ai}∞i=1 ∈ F is disjoint, then P
⋃∞
i=1Ai =
∑∞
i=1 P (Ai)
P (A) is the probability of the event A, i.e. ”‘the probability that the
event A occurs”’. In particular, if P (A) = 1 it can be said that ”‘A
occurs with probability 1, or almost surely (a.s.)”’
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If Ω = Rn, F = B is a Borel σ − algebra, i.e.the smallest σ − algebra
containing all open sets of Rn.
If Ω = Rn and F = B, then the probability measures defined in this space is
called distribution.
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